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Bypassing Federalism and the
Administrative Law of Negawatts
Sharon B. Jacobs*
ABSTRACT: Presidential unilateralism has become a defining feature of the
executive branch. But a related and equally important phenomenon has been
largely ignored: federal agency efforts to circumvent statutory federalism
boundaries. This move, which the Article calls "bypassing federalism, "
involves using existing jurisdictional authority to work defacto, rather than
dejure, reallocations of power. The Article explores agency bypassing through
the lens of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's ("FERC's") promotion
of demand response in electricity markets. Demand response refers to customer
sales of negative watts, or "negawatts, "back to the electrical grid. FERC, eager
to promote demand-side management programs but stymied by the
jurisdictional imitations in the Federal Power Act of 193 5, recently adopted
a strategy that bypasses these federalism boundaries by setting up demand
response programs in wholesale markets, which are under its control, to
parallel state and local programs.
Although the strategy has boosted demand response program participation,
the Article ultimately concludes that bypassing is an insalubrious
administrative innovation. While it allows agencies to further national
objectives without challenging jurisdictional boundaries head on, the strategy
has significant downsides. First, statutory constraints may limit an agency's
options in a way that results in the promotion of second-best over first-best
policies. Second, even de facto jurisdictional adjustments raise federalism
questions that we might prefer be addressed through the legislative process.
Third, bypassing can be a costly strategy to the extent that it creates animosity
between federal agencies and their state counterparts and fails to head off
judicial showdowns. Finally, by making a dysfunctional statutory scheme
workable, bypassing threatens to delay legislative solutions.
* Associate Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School. I would like to thank
Seth Davis, Jake Gersen, Michael Morley, John Nagle, Seth Stoughton, Phil Weiser, and the
participants at the University of Washington Young Environmental Law Scholars Workshop and
the Vermont Law School Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship for valuable input. All
mistakes are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
The exercise of unilateral executive authority is well-studied, but until
recently, the focus has been almost exclusively on the President's foreign
affairs power.' Increasingly, however, federal agencies are addressing gaps
between statutory authority and present realities on their own initiative. In
some cases, they are doing so by circumventing statutory federalism
boundaries to promote favored programs in the face of state, rather than
congressional, intransigence. In these efforts to "bypass federalism," agencies
themselves may be the drivers of policy rather than the White House.
This Article analyzes this growing phenomenon through the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission's ("FERC's") regulation of consumer demand
for electricity. Specifically, it focuses on FERC's efforts to promote demand
response programs in electricity markets. Demand response refers to a retail
customer's reduction of energy consumption in response to a price signal or
incentive payment.2 This commitment not to consume has been described as
a sale of negative watts, or "negawatts," back to the electrical grid.3 While
utilities and regulators have experimented with energy efficiency since the oil
crises and resulting energy price spikes of the 197os, demand response
programs are a relatively recent innovation. Only in the last decade have
advances in energy metering and communications technologies made
1. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
AFTER 9/11 (2012) (identifying a long-term trend of expanding executive power and arguing
that this expansion has preserved balance within the federal government); ERIC A. POSNER &
ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)
(concluding that a strong executive is a modern necessity); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty,
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004) (challenging, on
both textual and historical grounds, the idea that the Vesting Clause bestows broad
unenumerated powers on the President); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign
Relations Law, i 16 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007) (arguing that the court should defer to executive
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions even where those interpretations are
inconsistent with the comity doctrine).
Comparatively less attention has been paid to the executive's authority to accomplish domestic
agendas without the aid of new legislation. For examples of recent treatments with a domestic
focus, seejody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014);
RichardJ. Lazarus, Howard & Katherine Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., Chair Lecture:
Environmental Lawlessness (Apr. 1o, 2013). More recently still, Daphna Renan has suggested
that the executive can enlarge his or her unilateral policymaking authority through the
manipulation of administrative structures. Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015).
2. For a more detailed definition of demand response, see U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS
OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM: A
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 1252 OF THE ENERGY POLICY
ACrOF 2005, at 6 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 DOE REPORT].
3. Credit for coining the term "negawatt" generally goes to physicist and energy policy
expert Amory Lovins. Amory B. Lovins, Saving Gigabucks with Negawatts, PUB. UTIL. FORT. Mar. 21,
1985, at 19.
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widespread deployment of demand response programs possible.4 Properly
implemented, demand response programs can prevent electricity price
spikes, enhance reliability, and produce environmental benefits. For these
reasons, FERC believes that demand response is an essential component of a
"smarter" energy policy.5
While there is a significant economics literature on demand-side
management and demand response,6 legal commentators have paid much less
attention to demand response programs.7 More attention is warranted,
however, for three reasons. First, demand response programs are already
widespread and will only grow in importance as enabling technologies
continue to develop. The programs are increasingly being touted as a solution
to such diverse problems as integrating more renewable resources into the
grid and the Texas energy market's thin reserve margins.8 Demand response
might also be used to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA's") proposed limitations on carbon pollution from existing power
plants.9
4. See Marc Lipski, Demand Response-Technology for the Smart Grid, ELECTRItr'y TODAY, May
201 1, for a discussion of the relationship between demand response and its enabling technologies.
5. FERC maintains that effective demand response "can help reduce electric price volatility,
mitigate generation market power, and enhance reliability." See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, Demand Response, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/demand-response.
asp (last visitedJan. 19, 2015).
6. See, e.g., Robert Borlick, Paying for Demand-Side Response at the Wholesale Level: The Small
Consumers' Perspective, ELECRICITYJ., Nov. 201 1, at 8; Hung-po Chao, Price-Responsive Demand
Managementfora Smart Grid World, ELECTRICITYJ.,Jan.-Feb. 201o, at 7; William W. Hogan, Demand
Response Compensation, Net Benefits and Cost Allocation: Comments, ELECTRIcITYJ., Nov. 201 o, at 1 9.
7. Three exceptions are Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?: FERC's Authority over
Demand Response Compensation i  Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN DIEGOJ. CLIMATE & ENERGY L.
69 (2012-2013) (defending FERC's Order 745 and the participation of aggregators in demand
response programs); RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., A Primer on Demand Response and a Critique ofFERC Order
745, 3 GEO. WASH.J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102 (2012) (providing a brief overview of demand
response and arguing that the compensation level set by FERC is inefficiently high); and Jon
Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of Demand Response: The Second Half of
the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 28 ENERGY LJ. 389 (2007) (defending the federal role in
demand response markets). There is also some discussion of demand response in Michael
Vandenbergh andJim Rossi's recent article on financial incentives for net demand reduction. See
Michael P. Vandenbergh &Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive for Net
Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527 (2012) (arguing that new financial incentives for
electric distribution utilities are needed if net demand reductions are to exert meaningful
downward pressure on carbon emissions).
8. See infra Part I.B. 1. On the Texas reserve margins, see Terrence Henry, Meet the Answer
to Texs'AC Problem: Demand Response, STATEIMPACT (Jan. 30, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://stateimpact.
npr.org/texas/201 4/01 /3o/why-texas-power-demand-is-slowing-meet-demand-response/; Jim
Malewit7, Demand Response Could Factor in Grid Debate, TEx. TRIB. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.
texastribune.org/ 2014/01/24/demand-response-could-factor-grid-debate/preview/.
9. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,850 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at4o C.F.R. pt. 6o).
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Second, as this growth occurs, it is important not to let enthusiasm for
demand response blind regulators to program weaknesses and the values
trade-offs they create. In order for demand response programs to deliver the
peak load reductions they promise, effective measurement and verification
strategies must be in place to prevent system gaming. Furthermore, demand
response, if not coordinated with energy efficiency and other conservation
strategies, threatens to alleviate peak load problems at the expense of overall
conservation and environmental goals.
Third, demand response presents an ideal case study through which to
understand the shifting federalism dynamics in energy law. In pursuing
expansion of demand response programs, FERC has run up against the
jurisdictional limitations of the Federal Power Act of 935 ("FPA") .o The FPA
gave the federal government new control over interstate transmission and
wholesale sales of electricity, while states retained their traditionaljurisdiction
over generation, as well as intrastate transmission and distribution and retail
sales.- With few exceptions, those lines have not been updated since the
FPA's passage, 78 years ago. Meanwhile, national energy policy has become
increasingly ambitious, particularly with respect to demand-side innovations.
Consider, for example, President Obama's call to the nation to "cut in half
the energy wasted by our homes and businesses over the next twenty years."'1
Or consider Congress's statement in the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007 ("EISA") that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to . . .
achieve... [d] evelopment and incorporation of demand response, demand-
side resources, and energy-efficiency resources."'3 Federal actors' increased
emphasis on energy policy has only served to highlight the widening gap
between national ambition and what the federal government can accomplish
under the FPA.14
This Article describes FERC's efforts to accomplish broad statutory goals
for controlling electricity demand in the face of a federalism structure that
places primary responsibility in the hands of state and local regulators. It
introduces FERC's creative approach to the problem, which the Article calls
"bypassing federalism." Bypassing involves the use of clear jurisdictional
authority to achieve policy aims without challengingjurisdictional boundaries
head on. An agency seeking to bypass federalism allocations is thus attempting
io. Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (2012).
il . Id.
12. Obama's 2013 State of the Union Address, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.nyimes.
com/2o13/02/13/us/politics/obamas-2013-state-of-the-union-address.html. President Obama
acknowledged the limits of federal power to make that goal a reality when he offered the states
an incentive to improve energy efficiency in businesses. Id.
13. Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. i 1o-14o, § 1301, 121 Stat.
1492, 1784 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
14. The problem of statutory lags is, of course, not unique to energy law-it is endemic to
the legislative process. In energy law, however, the problem is unusual in that it presents as a
federalism question.
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to work a de facto, rather than a dejure, reallocation of power. It does so by
maximizing its influence within its designated sphere, hoping that its actions
will have effects beyond the area of its immediate control.'5 In the case of
demand response, FERC has "bypassed" the federalism boundaries in the FPA
by setting up demand response programs in wholesale markets, which are
under FERC's control, to parallel state and local programs. This strategy has
allowed FERC to further national objectives for demand reduction programs
without the need for formal jurisdictional challenges.'
6
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces demand response
programs and explains their benefits, as well as potential downsides if
programs are poorly designed or poorly coordinated with other energy
demand strategies. It also offers a brief overview of electricity regulation in
the United States to situate demand response programs in historical
perspective. Part II explores the existing regulatory approach to demand
response in more detail. Early regulation was experimental and largely sub-
federal. More recently, the federal government has attempted more
significant interventions, but these interventions have run up against limits on
federal jurisdiction in the FPA. Rather than accept these limitations, FERC
has responded by setting up demand response programs in wholesale
markets, which it controls, to compete with state-regulated programs.
Part III concludes that bypassing is a problematic method of achieving
greater federal control over the demand side of the energy equation. It
brackets the larger question of whether greater federal control over electricity
regulation is desirable, assuming, for the sake of argument, that federalization
is a defensible goal. Nevertheless, it argues that although bypassing federalism
can be helpful where, as with demand response, uniformity across programs
is desirable, the strategy also has significant downsides. First, statutory
constraints may limit an agency's options in a way that results in the
promotion of second-best over first-best policies. In the electricity demand
context, this has manifested as an emphasis on temporary reductions in the
use of electricity through demand response programs, rather than the more
permanent reductions that can be achieved through energy efficiency.
Second, because bypassing raises central questions about the proper
allocation of power between the states and the federal government, we might
prefer that any rebalancing be done through the legislative process. Third,
15. There are parallels between FERC's efforts and what Catherine Sharkey and Samuel
Issacharoff have called the "quiet federalization" of key areas of law. Samuel Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1353 (2oo6) (addressing the
partial federalization of commercial law subjects traditionally governed by states).
16. FERC's strategy is still being litigated, and a panel of the D.C. Circuit recently
invalidated a portion of it on jurisdictional grounds. See Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 753
F.3 d 2 16, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2014). However, the court stayed its ruling to allow the government time
to petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. The government filed for a writ of
certiorari in January of this year. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply
Ass'n, 753 F.3 d 216 (2015).
[Vol. 1OO:88 5
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bypassing may not avoid costly conflicts, judicial or otherwise. Finally, by
making a dysfunctional statutory scheme workable, bypassing threatens to
defer, perhaps indefinitely, more permanent legislative solutions.
I. THE ELECrRIC GRID AND DEMAND RESPONSE
This Part provides a brief background of United States electricity
regulation and describes some of the momentous changes the industry has
undergone in the past several decades. Over a relatively short period of time,
much of the country has moved from a regulated monopoly structure, in
which utilities were granted exclusive service territory in return for agreeing
to provide reliable service at regulated rates, to competitive markets, in which
power providers compete for business.
Increased competition and the dissemination of disruptive technologies
like smart meters have enabled consumers to play an increasingly active role
in energy markets.,7 Customers are now able to provide demand-side
management services by reducing energy usage at times of peak consumption.
Properly implemented, these demand response programs produce important
benefits for the electrical grid and electricity markets. They have the potential
to lower peak prices, enhance reliability, and, in some cases, produce positive
environmental externalities. These benefits will be addressed in the second
part of this section.
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION
To understand demand response, it is first necessary to understand the
dramatic shifts that have taken place in the United States electricity markets
in the past several decades.'8 The electric power industry was once considered
a natural monopoly.'9 Because of the intensity of capital costs involved in
building power plants and transmission lines, it was deemed inefficient to
have more than one utility serving each geographic region. Thus, utilities
were granted monopolies over service territories. These utilities were
"vertically integrated" because a single entity owned generation (power
plants), transmission (long-distance, higher-voltage transportation of
17. The Department of Energy ("DOE") has explored the relationship between smart grid
technologies such as smart meters and active customer participation in the electric power system.
See NAT'L ENERGY TECH. LAB., SMART GRID PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS: ENABLES ACTIVE
PARTICIPATION BY CONSUMERS 9 (20o9), available at https://www.smartgrid.gov/sites/default/
files/doc/files/SmartGridPrincipalCharacteristicsEnablesActiveParticip_2 oo9 o6.pdf.
18. The genesis of electrical power and the rise of the electric utility in the late nineteenth
century is a fascinating story, but one this Article does not have space to do justice. For two
versions of this story focusing on the lives of key industry players, see, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD,
INSULL: THE RISE AND FALL OF A BILLIONAIRE UTILITY TYCOON (1962); JOHN F. WASIK, THE
MERCHANT OF POWER: SAM INSULL, THOMAS EDISON, AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN
METROPOLIS (2oo6).
19. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIAtS 53-54 (3d ed. 2010).
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energy), and distribution (local, lower-voltage transportation of energy to the
end user).-o
The consequences of the vertically integrated utility model for electricity
demand were significant. In exchange for exclusive service territories, public
utilities agreed to have retail rates approved by regulators.21 State public utility
commissions set these rates at a level calculated to allow utilities to recover
both fixed and variable costs and to provide a reasonable rate of return on
investment.22 One consequence of this rate structure was that when the utility
sold more power than projected during a given rate cycle, it made more
money. The system thus created an incentive for utilities to sell as much
electricity as possible.23
Initially, public utilities were subject only to state regulation.24 Not until
192o did Congress first move to regulate power production at the federal level
through the Federal Water Power Act ("FWPA").25 The FWPA focused mainly
on hydroelectric power, but it also created the Federal Power Commission
("FPC"), the predecessor to FERC. In 1935, the FWPA was renamed the
Federal Power Act, and FPC's jurisdiction was expanded to include
"transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce."26 However, Congress noted that
federal jurisdiction extended "only to those matters which are not subject to
20. Monopoly status came with benefits as well as responsibilities. In exchange for an
exclusive service territory, the right to charge regulated retail rates, limits on liability for
negligence, and the power of eminent domain, utilities were obligated to serve all customers in
their territory, to provide quality service, and to consent to regulation. Scott Hempling, The
Changing Fundamentals of Electricity Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
21. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 46.
22. Id. at 65.
23. For information about the ratemaking process and its incentives, see, e.g., Decoupling in
Detail CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, www.cles.org/us-states-regions/policy-
maps/decoupling/detail (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). For alternative interventions designed to
shift utility incentives to promote efficiency, see Paul L.Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive
Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALEJ. ON REG. i, I (1986) (discussing the use by an increasing
number of state public utility commissions of rewards or penalties based on utility performance).
24. See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Lou-Carbon Future 61 UCLAL. REV. 1614, 1639-40
(2014).
25. See Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285,41 Star. 1o63 (1920), amended by Federal Power
Act, i6 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (2012).
26. Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 79i-828c (2012). In Title I of the Act, better
known as the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUHCA"), Congress broke up the
companies that, together, owned nearly three quarters of all U.S. utilities. However, the
monopolistic structure at the utility level remained unchanged. Although the Federal Power
Commission ("FPC") would not be renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") until 1977, seeDepartment of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-9 1, 91 Star. 565
(1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012)), its five-member, bipartisan
commission structure was established in 1930. What is FF-RC?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION,
http://www.ferc.gov/students/whatisferc.asp (last visitedJan. 20, 2015).
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regulation by the States."7 The jurisdictional lines Congress drew in the 1935
Act have remained largely unaltered.
The next major shift in the electric power industry did not occur until
the 1970s, when politics and soaring energy prices ignited a movement to
deregulate the industry.28  Proponents of deregulation argued that
introducing competition would both lead to lower electricity prices and
expand consumer choice.29 In the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 ("PURPA"), Congress took its first steps toward deregulation,
diversifying generation by promoting small renewable energy and
cogeneration facilities.3o Then, in the Energy Power Act of 1992, Congress
provided additional incentives for independent power producers, creating
increased competition in wholesale markets.s1
FERC, not Congress, took the next deregulatory step. Utilities were
proving reluctant to open up their transmission networks to independent
power producers, which limited those producers' ability to get their power to
consumers.32 In Order 888, FERC required utilities to make their
transmission lines available to independent producers at non-discriminatory
prices.ss Over the next several years, 24 states made moves to break up their
traditional vertically integrated utilities by requiring or permitting utilities to
sell off generation assets.s4 After the California energy crisis in 2ooo, however,
27. What is FERC?, supra note 26.
28. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 613-14.
29. See Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 7, at 391 ("An important principle underlying
this industry restructuring is that greater eliance on more competitive markets will bring greater
benefits to the country's electricity consumers."). On restructuring generally, see, e.g., Richard
D. Cudahy, Electric Deregulation After California: Down but Not Out, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 336-39
(2002); David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 417 (2005).
30. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 9 5-617, 9 2 Stat. 3117 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 26o (201 2)). Cogeneration facilities are plants that generate electricity
and also use the heat created during the generation process for some useful purpose, such as
heating water. Congress sought to ensure the viability of these facilities and small, cleaner energy
facilities by requiring utilities to purchase power from them at avoided cost (the incremental cost of
energy that the utility would have procured from non-renewable sources). According to the Union
of Concerned Scientists, "PURPA has been the most effective single measure in promoting
renewable energy." Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), UNION OF CONCERNED SciENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean energy/smart-energy-solutions/strengthen-policy/public-utility-
regulatory.html#.VJ8Y4v8JOh (last visitedJan. 20, 2015).
31. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, io6 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended
at42 U.S.C. 13201 (2012)).
32. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 1o, 1996) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) ("Order 888").
33. Id.
34. For a map with state-by-state information on electricity restructuring, see Status of
Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/
policies/restructuring/restructureelect.html ( ast updated Sept. 20 o).
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many states backtracked.35 As of 2010, 15 states and the District of Columbia
had restructured their utilities.36
To help coordinate transmission and ensure nondiscriminatory prices in
the wake of restructuring, FERC encouraged the creation of Independent
System Operators ("ISOs") and Regional Transmission Operators ("RTOs").37
ISOs and RTOs are independent, non-profit regional institutions that manage
transmission across the region. To accomplish this, each RTO or ISO must set
its own rules for pricing and managing the transmission of electric energy.38
There are seven ISO/RTO regions in the United States.39 Each institution's
activities are overseen by an independent market monitor, and the entities
themselves are regulated as public utilities by FERC.4o
In these newly competitive wholesale markets, and in restructured state
markets, keeping the price of electricity down and ensuring grid reliability are
major concerns. Demand response can help with both.
B. THE RISE OF DEMAND RESPONSE
Competitive energy markets pose new challenges for regulators. In
particular, regulators must be especially vigilant in competitive markets to
ensure that industry generates adequate supply to meet customer demand.4'
Especially in a competitive energy marketplace, therefore, demand response
is an important tool to maintain the balance of supply and demand on the
electricity grid. While the term "grid" suggests a static structure, electricity is
35. See generally James L. Sweeney, The California Electricity Crisis: Lessons for the Future,
BRIDGE, Summer 2002, at 23 (explaining the events that led to the California electricity crisis and
arguing that California's failed experiment should not deter other states from pursuing retail
restructuring of their electricity industries).
36. See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, supra note 34. The current numbers depend
on the definition of restructuring adopted and range from 13 (plus D.C.) to 16. See Severin
Borenstein &James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20 Years of Restructuring 23 n.24
(Energy Inst. at Haas Working Paper Series, No. 252, 2014), available at http://ei.haas.berkeley.
edu/pdf/working__papers/WP252.pdf.
37. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 81o, 81o, 812-13 (Jan. 6, 2000)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. Pt. 35).
38. Id. at 812.
39. The seven RTO/ISOs are the California ISO ("CAISO"), the Midcontinent
Independent System Operator, Inc. ("MISO"), the Southwest Power Pool ("SPP"), the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas ("ERCOT"), PJM Interconnection ("PJM"), the New York ISO
("NYISO") and ISO New England ("ISO-NE").
40. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 81 o, 815 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. Pt. 35).
41. See Paul L. Joskow, Competitive Electricity Markets and Investment in New Generating Capacity,
in THE NEW ENERGY PARADIGM 76 (Dieter Helm ed., 2007), available at http://economics.mit.
edu/files/ 119o (discussing the challenges of resource adequacy in competitive electricity
markets).
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constantly coursing through the grid's wires at nearly the speed of light.42 This
is necessary because, since our ability to store energy efficiently is minimal,
supply and demand must be maintained in perpetual balance.43 Maintaining
this equilibrium and avoiding blackouts is no simple matter-it has been
described as "the world's biggest balancing act."44 The balancing act is made
more difficult by the fact that demand for energy is highly variable.45 It has
been estimated that the top io% of all energy "load" consumed each year is
consumed in the top 1% of hours during that year.46
Until relatively recently, balance was maintained almost exclusively by
regulating the amount of generation supplied at any given time so that it
matched demand exactly.47 In most markets, to ensure that there are enough
power plants to meet variations in demand, commitments to supply
generation must be obtained by utilities (in retail markets) and by
independent grid operators (in wholesale markets) in advance with a
comfortable margin of error, called a reserve requirement.48 In practice, this
reserve requirement means that utilities must plan for the construction of
plants, called "peaking plants" because they are only run to meet peak
demand, that sit idle for most of the year.49
The supply-side focus was viable when fossil fuels, the raw material for
energy generation, were cheap. However, beginning with the OPEC oil crisis
in the early 197os, during which oil prices quadrupled over just a few years,
42. See Transmission, EDISON ELECTRIc INST., http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/trans
mission/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2015). In fact, the word "energy" has Greek roots
that mean "active."
43. Storage technologies have not been developing at a rapid pace. As MIT professor and
former Undersecretary of Energy John Deutch put it in 2009, "[p]eople have been calling for
advances in batteries ever since I was director of energy research at the U.S. Department of
Energy in the mid-197os, but we've seen essentially none." Oil Lessons from the 1970s, INT'L ECON.,
Fall 2oo9, at 26, 61, available at http://www.international-economy.com/TIE_Fo9_Yergin
JohnstonDeutch.pdf.
44. Christopher Joyce, Power Grid Must Adapt to Handle Renewable Energy, NPR (Mar. 12,
2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2o12/03/12/14831 89o5/renewable-energy-throws-
power-grid-off-balance.
45. This variability is due to both weather variations and human behavior patterns. Some
renewable resources, such as solar and wind, compound this problem by introducing variation
into the supply side of the equation. Because the sun only shines during the day (and is sometimes
filtered by cloud cover) and because the wind blows only intermittently, solar and wind
generation facilities do not supply a constant stream of power.
46. AHMAD FARUQUI ET AL., IMPACT EVALUATION OF ONTARIO'S TIME-OF-USE RATES: FIRST
YEAR ANALYSIS 2 (2013). This problem was exacerbated by the advent of air conditioners, which
account for approximately 5% of all electricity consumed in the United States. You Asked, We Are
Answering: Your Home Efficiency Questions, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY. (Sept. 24, 2 012 5:12 PM), http://
energy.gov/articles/you-asked-we-are-answering-your-home-efficiency-questions.
47. BOSSELMAN ETAL., supra note 19, at 58o-81.
48. See, e.g., Reserve Electric Generating Capacity Helps Keep the Lights On, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (June 1, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=651 o.
49. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 58o.
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cost control became a major concern for energy regulators.5o To that end,
they began to focus on the other side of the energy equation: reducing
demand as an alternative to expanding supply.
i. Demand Response Programs
The most widely used definition of demand response comes from a 2oo6
Department of Energy ("DOE") report. DOE explained that demand
response means:
Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal
consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of
electricity over time, or to incentive payments designed to induce
lower electricity use at times of high wholesale market prices or when
system reliability isjeopardized.5
Technological advances are what have made demand response programs
possible. These enabling technologies are those we typically associate with a
"smarter" grid, including "smart" meters, energy management systems, and
other communication technologies.
Traditional utility meters work like a car's odometer, showing only the
total energy consumed, and must be read manually. Smart meters, by contrast,
are digital and can not only record total consumption but can report usage
data to the utility at regular intervals.5z Demand response programs rely on
this information to establish a customer's typical usage and to measure any
reductions in electricity consumption. Smart meters can also communicate
pricing information to customers. For customers participating in "energy"
demand response programs, this pricing information enables them to decide
whether it is economically advantageous for them to curtail usage on a given
day.
In addition, energy management systems now allow customers to control
their electricity-consuming devices using a single program. While it is still
possible to reduce electricity usage the old-fashioned way, by turning lights,
heating, ventilation, and cooling ("HVAC") systems, and appliances down or
50
,  
See Douglas Martin, Energy Shortage Eases Materially; Basic Shifts in Consumption Cited, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03 /o8/business/energy-shortage-eases-
materially-basic-shifts-in-consumption-cited.html.
51. 2oo6 DOE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. FERC has also adopted this definition. FED.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, 2oo8 ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & ADvANCED METERING:
STAFF REPORT C-2 (2oo8) [hereinafter 2008 FERC ASSESSMENT]. California's definition is similar.
Decision Adopting Demand Response Activities and Budgets for 2012-2014 at 2, Application of
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (U 39E) for Approval of Demand Response Programs, Pilots & Budgets for
2012-2014, Decision No. 12-04-045 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 19, 2012), available atdocs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/PUBLISHED/GRAPHICS/165317.pdf ("The Commission broadly defines
demand response (DR) as reductions or shifts in electricity consumption by customers in
response to either economic or reliability signals.").
52. For a discussion of advanced meters and their penetration, see 2008 FERC ASSESSMENT,
supra note 51, at 25.
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off, energy management systems make the process much simpler.5s These
systems can facilitate energy audits to provide a detailed picture of a
customer's energy usage. The audit results can be used to assess how much
electrical load the customer could drop if the utility called upon it to do so as
part of a demand response program.
There are two major types of demand response programs. First are rate-
based programs, including time-of-use pricing plans, which allow the retail
price of electricity to fluctuate based on its actual cost. Second are incentive-
based programs, where customers receive additional compensation in
exchange for energy reductions when the grid is under particular strain and
costs are high.54
Unlike the incentive-based demand response programs that are the
primary focus of this Article, time-of-use ("TOU") pricing plans incentivize
changes in customer demand for electricity by making electricity
consumption at peak times more expensive than consumption at off-peak
times.55 Depending on the pricing scheme, customers in TOU plans, unlike
customers in incentive-based demand response programs, might end up
paying more for electricity, on balance, if they consume energy at the "wrong"
times.
Critical Peak Pricing ("CPP") is also a change in rate structure, but, in
contrast to TOU pricing, CPP focuses only on prices during peak
consumption hours, typically from noon through the evening on weekdays.56
During these periods, customers pay a higher (sometimes significantly
53. Even more advanced systems allow for "direct load control," or remote operation of
electricity-consuming systems by a utility or third-party energy provider. Equipment currently
eligible for direct load control includes air conditioners, lighting, motors, and pumps. See, e.g.,
Contracted Direct Load Control (CDLC), WIS. PUB. SERVICE http://www.wisconsinpublicservice.com/
business/cdlc.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2015). A new generation of smart meters can facilitate
this process. SeeJeff St. John, The Elusive Smart Meter-Demand Response Combo, GREENTECHGRID
(June 24, 2009), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/theelusive-smart-meter-
demand-response-combo.
54- See CLARK W. GELLINGS, THE SMART GRID: ENABLING ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND DEMAND
RESPONSE 141 (2009) (dividing demand response into "incentive-based demand response" and
"time-based rates"). There is also an important distinction between demand response, which
seeks to shift consumption patterns, and energy efficiency, which seeks to lower overall energy
usage. Imprecise use of terminology risks creating confusion on this front. The goal of demand
response is to reduce usage of energy at imes of peak consumption, and it is entirely consistent with
a demand response program for customers to continue consuming the same net amount of
energy, merely altering the times at which that energy is consumed or the sources from which it
comes.
55. See Ahmad Faruqui &Jennifer Palmer, Dynamic Pricing and Its Discontents: Empirical Data
Show Dynamic Pricing of Electricity Would Benefit Consumers, Including the Poor, REGULATION, Fall
2oi,at 16, 17.
56. See Frank Wolak, Residential Customer Response to Real-Time Pricing: The Anaheim Critical-
Peak Pricing Experiment (Univ. Cal. Energy Inst. Working Paper Series, No. 151, 2oo6), available at
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3td3n ix I.
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higher) price for electricity. CPP can be implemented on its own or combined
with TOU pricing.
Some pilot programs have shown that TOU and CPP produce reductions
in customer demand at peak times.57 But roll-out has been slow, primarily
because of technological hurdles and customer opposition. TOU programs
offer both carrots and sticks-if customers are savvy, they can reduce their
overall energy bills, but if they hew closer to normal consumption patterns,
they could find themselves paying more. CPP programs, on the other hand,
are all stick in that they create a new, more expensive pricing scheme for peak
hours.
This Article focuses on the second of the two types of demand response:
incentive-based programs. Unlike CPP and TOU programs, incentive-based
programs are all carrot in that they offer income opportunities to customers
without imposing higher rates. FERC has favored these programs for one
practical reason: it has no jurisdiction over retail rates. Therefore, it cannot
create retail rate-based programs, and requiring TOU pricing for retail
customers is not possible in wholesale markets, which do not supply customers
with electricity directly. For that reason, FERC has focused on incentive-based
demand response to flatten consumption at times of peak demand.
Customers enrolled in demand response programs that are called upon
to reduce electrical load may do so in several ways. First, they might simply
use energy management systems to drop load, or they might reduce the load
manually. This may, but does not necessarily, result in a net reduction of
electricity consumption for that consumer since consumption might simply
be shifted to another time of day. For instance, an industrial facility might
defer production of widgets until after the emergency period or period of
higher prices has passed. Second, facilities might switch to using energy that
has been consumed earlier and stored using thermal or other storage systems.
Finally, the customer might switch to "behind-the-meter" power-power
produced on-site, typically by diesel generators. All of these methods result
57. See generally PAT MCAULIFFE & ARTHUR ROSENFELD, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, RESPONSE OF
RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS TO CRITICAL PEAK PRICING AND TIME-OF-USE RATES DURING THE SUMMER
OF 2003 (2004), available at http://sites.energetics.com/MADRI/toolbox/pdfs/pricing/
residential-customers.pdf (concluding based on a pilot program in California that customers do
respond to price even in the absence of automated controls, but that the response can be
improved if utilities can control customer usage through automation); AHMAD FARUQUI ET AL.,
THE BRAT-rLE GRP., IMPACT EvALUATION OF ONTARIO'S TIME-OF-USE RATES: FIRST YEAR ANALYSIS
(2o1 3), available at http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/ooo/004/967/original/
ImpactEvaluation-ofOntariO%27sTime-of-Use_Rates-First_YearAnalysisFaruqui-et alNov
_26_2o 13.pdf? 1386626350 (finding consistent load-shifting behavior by residential customers in
response to pricing plans). But see generally J.S. PETERS ET AL., ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE
BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., POWERCHOICE RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER RESPONSE TO TOU RATES (2009),
available at http://drrc.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/bnl-3870e.pdf (concluding that a pilot time-of-use
pricing program by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District for residential customers resulted
in only modest shifts in consumption patterns).
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in a reduction of power drawn from the grid, although not all reduce the total
amount of electricity consumed.
As for the incentive-based emand response programs themselves, they
are diverse both in terms of program design and the entities that offer them.
In general, demand response programs come in three types. First are "energy"
programs, which are voluntary and allow customers to bid their demand
reductions into retail or wholesale markets in exchange for a payment linked
to the size of the reduction they can offer. Because a standardized terminology
is lacking in the demand response space, these programs are sometimes
referred to as "price-responsive demand" or "economic load response"
programs. Second are "capacity" programs, also known as "emergency load
response" or "reliability-based demand response" programs. As discussed
above, utilities and grid operators in most parts of the country must ensure
that they procure enough energy supply, or capacity, to cover demand at all
times.58 Customers who agree in advance to decrease their demand when the
grid is stressed can reduce the amount of capacity that needs to be locked in.
In exchange, these customers receive regular payments, whether or not they
are ever called on to perform. If called, however, participation is mandatory,
with penalties for noncompliance.59
Finally, customers participating in demand response programs, also
known as "demand response resources" ince they are serving as a resource
for the grid, are now eligible to participate in some markets for "ancillary
services." These are markets for the sale of small amounts of energy in close
to real time to keep supply and demand in perfect balance. This is done by
making minor adjustments to the amount and frequency of power flowing
through transmission lines. Resources in these programs must be able to
provide power or, in the case of demand resources, reductions in energy
usage, on very short notice.
6o
Program structure and rules also vary within these categories. Each
program has its own rules for, among other things, eligibility, participation,
measuring compliance, and compensation. All wholesale market programs,
58. Notably, Texas, which operates on its own grid system, has never implemented a
capacity market. For more on the debate, see Edward Klump, Texas Power Market Debate Poised to
Heat Up After Cold Snap, E&E ENERGYWIRE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1o59
992597/print.
59. Despite the mandatory participation obligation, these programs are very attractive
because they provide a steady income stream and because customers are typically only called "a
few hours per year, when wholesale electricity market prices are at their highest or when reserve
margins are low due to contingencies such as generator outages, downed transmission lines, or
severe weather conditions." 2006 DOE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
6o. In Order 755, FERC required that RTOs and ISOs compensate ancillary services
resources based on how well they perform, which means that resources that can be brought
online quickly, like demand response, will be compensated more generously. See generally
Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, 75 Fed. Reg.
29,531 (May 26, 2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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and some retail programs, allow the participation of middlemen who
aggregate smaller demand response commitments from customers and bid
them into the markets as a package. These companies are called Aggregators
of Retail Customers ("ARCs") or Curtailment Service Providers ("CSPs"),
depending on the market.6 Demand response has become big business,6.
with aggregators like EnerNOC and Comverge expanding both nationally and
internationally, and traditional generation companies like Exelon branching
out into demand response services.63
Entities offering demand response programs include utilities64 in the
retail markets as well as RTOs and ISOs in the wholesale markets. Even the
Tennessee Valley Authority, a federal corporation which provides low-cost
power to customers in the southeastern United States, offers demand
response programs.65
2. Benefits and Costs of Demand Response
Demand response has won influential supporters including recently
retired FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff.66 Although the benefits of demand
61. The advantages of this approach are two-fold: (1) it allows smaller customers who would
otherwise be excluded from the markets because of minimum size restrictions to participate; and
(2) it mitigates the risk of customer nonperformance, since an over-performing customer within
an aggregator's territory can make up for another customer's under-performance.
62. PG&E, a Northern California utility, estimates that collective customer revenues since
2oo6 for participation in the utility's demand response programs exceed $1 oo million. Demand
Response FAQs, PG&E, http://www.pge.com/en/mybusiness/save/energymanagement/faq/
index.page (click "What incentives have the Demand Response Programs Generated?") (last
visitedJan. 20, 2015).
63. Exelon began offering demand response services in 2010 through its acquisition of
CPower. See Katherine Tweed, Constellation Wants to Lower Customer Bills with Demand Response,
GREENTECHMEDIA (Feb. 25, 2013), http://greentechmedia.com/articles/read/constellation-
offers-demand-response-to-lower-bills.
64. To generalize, these utilities typically come in three varieties. There are investor-owned
utilities, such as California's Pacific Gas & Electric Company, Ohio Edison, or Florida Power &
Light. There are the approximately 2000 publicly-owned utilities, such as the Marblehead,
Massachusetts Municipal Light Department, or the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District in
California. Finally, there are rural electricity cooperatives, such as the Minnesota Valley Electric
Cooperative and Buckeye Power in Ohio.
65. See FAQ - Tennessee Valley Authority Demand Response, ENERNOC, http://www.enernoc.
com/our-resources/brochures-faq/faq-tennessee-valley-authority-demand-response (last visited
Jan. 20, 2015). The TVA currently operates a year-round emergency load response program. Id.
66. See, e.g., Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 7, at 389; Interview by Chris Newkumet
with Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, in Washington, D.C. (Sept.
9, 2012), available at http://www.ferc.gov/media/videos/wellinghoff/2o2/09-09-12-
wellinghoff-transcript-pt2.pdf. ("[D]emand response ... [is] important to incorporate into the
overall energy markets because we want those markets to be as vibrant as possible and as
competitive as possible."). Former FERC Chairman Pat Wood was also a demand response
proponent. He testified before Congress in 2oo2 that "[diemand response is a crucial element
for efficient grid use, as well as an effective deterrent to the exercise of supplier market power."
Chris King & Dan Delurey, Advanced Metering: Policymakers Have the Ball, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept.
15, 2002, at 26.
[Vol. loo:885
BYPASSING FEDERALIJSM
response can be difficult to quantify,67 most agree that it has several
advantages as a grid-management ool. Foremost among these are its ability
to reduce the price of electricity and to improve system reliability. Where
programs are correctly designed, demand response can also have
environmental advantages over non-renewable generation.
Demand response can put downward pressure on prices in two ways. In
deregulated retail markets and in wholesale markets, demand response
reduces demand at times of peak consumption. Because energy can be up to
twenty times more expensive during such periods,68 leveling those demand
peaks reduces the price of energy.69 Figure 1 demonstrates how reducing
demand for energy lowers the market clearing price for power. The President
and CEO of ISO-NE has estimated that "reducing electricity use by five
percent during peak hours [through conservation and energy efficiency]
would save consumers approximately $580 million per year."7o Furthermore,
because demand response resources compete with traditional energy
suppliers in the market, they also reduce those suppliers' market power.7'
Making markets more competitive in this way can also keep prices down
because it reduces generators' power to withhold energy or to raise their
prices significantly above cost.7
2
67. 2oo6 DOE REPORT, supra note 2, at xvi ("Even after normalizing results, the estimated
gross benefits of demand response vary widely and are driven by the analytical methods used and
the assumptions made.") Variables include estimates of customer participation, time horizon,
markets, and methods of quantifying benefits and costs. Id. at vi-vii; see also id. at xvii ("Without
standardized and accepted analytical methods to quantify the benefits of demand response, DOE
finds that it is not possible to produce a meaningful estimate of the national benefits of demand
response.").
68. RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., How Will the California Debacle Affect Energy Deregulation?, 54 ADMIN.
L. REV. 389, 395 (2oo2) ("It often costs ten to twenty times as much to provide an additional unit
of electricity at a time of high demand rather than at a time of low demand."). This increase in
cost is largely due to the cost associated with running expensive "peaking plants"-plants that
cost more to run but can respond quickly to fluctuations in demand. 2oo6 DOE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 70 n.70.
69. According to an open 2007 letter from former FERC Commissioners to policymakers,
demand response programs in PJM "saved customers in [the] region more than $650 million-
$230 million in a single day." Letter from Vicky A. Bailey et al., Former Comm'rs, Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, to Policy Makers 2 (May 31, 2007), available at http://www.energylegal
blog.com/files/FormerCommissionersLetter53107.pdf [hereinafter Open Letter to Policy
Makers]. The absence of robust demand response has also been cited as a factor contributing to
California's energy crisis in 2ooo-2oo 1, where pricesjumped from around $3 5/kwh to a high of
$14oo/kwh in less than a year. William A. Borders, Learning from the Storm: Lessons for Illinois
Following California's Experience with Electricity Restructuring, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 333, 334 (200 1).
70. ISO NEW ENGLAND, ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 3 (2OO5).
71. See 2oo8 FERC ASSESSMENT, supra note 5 1, at 53; see also Early August Demand Response
Produces $65o Million Savings in PJM, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 17, 2OO6), http://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/early-august-demand-response-produces-65o-million-savings-in-pjm-56 1 92937.html.
72. See John Haffner, Market Power Mitigation in Electricity Markets: A Framework for Making
Choices, 6J. NETWORK INDUSTRIES 563, 178-79 (2005).
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Second, demand response can postpone or eliminate the need to build
additional generating units and transmission lines, which puts downward
pressure on retail prices since utilities will not need to recoup the costs of
those investments in the prices they charge to consumers.
Figure i. Impact of Demand Response on Vertically Integrated Utility
Supply Costs73
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Demand response can also provide reliability benefits. If a generator or
transmission line fails, or if demand surges so that supply reserves shrink,
reducing demand can return the grid to balance.74 Having adequate demand
response can thus result in fewer forced system outages.75 Two events, the
California energy crisis of 2000 and 2001 and the East Coast blackouts of
2003, have refocused energy regulators and utilities on system reliability.7
6
California's crisis in particular, which was precipitated by a poorly crafted
deregulatory process, is generally considered to have been exacerbated by the
absence of demand response programs.77 In a more recent demonstration of
the role of demand response in preserving system reliability, regulators in
Texas asked customers to reduce demand to avoid blackouts when unusually
cold weather coupled with generator outages led to a supply shortage.78
73. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM (2oo6), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/
files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOEBenefits ofDemandResponse in-ElectricityMark
ets andRecommendations forAchievingThemReporttoCongress.pdf
74. See 2008 FERC ASSESSMENT, supra note 5 1, at 46.
75. See 2oo6 DOE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
76. See Tony Clark & Robin Z. Meidhof, Ensuring Reliability and a FairEnergy Marketplace, 25
COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 354 (2o4).
77. See, e.g., Michael J. Gergen et al., Market-Based Ratemaking and the Western Energy Crisis of
2000 and 2001, 24 ENERGY L.J. 321, 337 n.107 (2003); Pierce, supra note 68, at 4o6 ("The
absence of any potential demand response was second only to infrastructure inadequacies as a
major cause of the California debacle.").
78. See Klump, supra note 58.
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Finally, demand response is often cited for its environmental benefits.79
By shifting consumption patterns, demand response can postpone the need
for new power plants to meet peak power demand. Demand response can also
facilitate the use of intermittent renewable generation such as wind and
solar8s For example, it has been suggested that California might not have
enough quick-starting generation to keep supply and demand in perfect
balance once more renewable generation facilities are integrated into the
supply mix.8' Demand response could help make up the deficit, enabling the
state to meet its goal of sourcing 33% of energy from renewable sources by
2020.82
However, demand response presents challenges as well. "Negawatts" are
difficult to price, and economists have hotly debated what price creates the
right incentives for program participation without overpaying.Ss Moreover,
for demand response to provide pricing and reliability benefits, program
participants must be able to perform when called upon and be able to drop
as much load as they are committed to providing. For this reason, eligibility,
79. See, e.g., Open Letter to Policy Makers, supra note 69, at 2 ("Demand response saves
customers money and promotes conservation and energy efficiency.").
8o. See, e.g., LeRoy Paddock & Charlotte Youngblood, Demand Response and Infrastnicture
Development in the United States, in ENERGY NETWORKS AND THE LAW: INNOVAIIVE SOLUTIONS IN
CHANGING MARKETS 161, 175 (Martha M. Roggenkamp et al. eds., 2012) (emphasizing the
problems associated with generating energy from wind in particular).
8. See Bruce W. Perlstein, Can Demand Response Programs Help Meet lte Renewable Energy
Integration Challenge?, BREAKING ENERGY (Aug. 9, 2012, 1 l:oo AM), http://breakingenergy.com/
201 2/o8/o9/can-demand-response-programs-help-meet-the-renewable-energy-inte/.
82. Id. Despite Perlstein's optimistic assessment in this article, a Navigant Consulting report,
which he co-authored, was more cautious in its evaluation. See BRUCE PERLSTEIN Er AL., NAVIGANT
CONSULTING, INC., POTENTIAL ROLE OF DEMAND RESPONSE RESOURCES IN MAINTAINING GRID
STABILITY AND INTEGRATING VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY UNDER CALIFORNIA'S 33 PERCENT
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD 6-t to -4 (2012), available at http://www.calmac.org/
publications/7-i8-i2_Final WhitePaper on Use oLDR for RenewableEnergyIntegration.pdf
(noting barriers related to program design, technological constraints, and market forces).
Nevertheless, the report concluded that, with appropriate modifications to existing programs
and/or the creation of new programs, demand response could play a role in facilitating the
integration ofrenewables into the portfolios of California utilities. Id. at 8-1.
83. The two poles of the debate are well represented by the late Alfred Kahn, on the one
hand, and William Hogan and Robert Borlick, on the other. Compare Reply Affidavit of Alfred E.
Kahn, Attachment A to Reply Comments of the Demand Response Supporters, Demand
Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Mkts., 134 FERC 6 1, 187 (2oi 1 ) (No.
RM o-17-000), available at http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20100913o9o259-Weishaar,%
2oDemand%2oResponse%2oSupporters.pdf (arguing that demand response is economically
equivalent to generation and should also be compensated at the LMP), with WILLIAM W. HOGAN,
DEMAND RESPONSE COMPENSN'ION, NET BENEFITS AND COST ALLOCATION: PRELIMINARY
COMMENTS (20o), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan-DRTech_
Confo9131 o.pdf (arguing that paying demand response providers the LMP is inefficient), and
Response of Robert L. Borlick to Professor Alfred E. Kahn, Demand Response Compensation in
Organized Wholesale Energy Mkts., 134 FERC 61,187 (2011) (No. RM o-I7-ooo) (arguing
that demand response is more like the sale of a call option than the sale of energy and that LMP
thus overcompensates demand response resources).
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testing, measurement, and verification requirements are particularly
important, as are penalties for failures to perform and other violations of
program rules. In addition, the net environmental benefits of demand
response are contingent on program design and the effective regulation of
the diesel back-up generation that many customers use to participate in
demand response programs.
II. THE ADMINISTRATiVE LAW OF NEGAWATrS
Until recently, regulation of demand response was almost exclusively the
responsibility of sub-federal entities with limited federal oversight. The
primary sub-federal regulatory entities are the state public utility commissions,
which are responsible for adopting rules that govern utilities within their
jurisdictions.84 The utilities themselves also have a role in regulating demand
response: they set the rules (which are subject to regulatory approval) for
participation in their own demand response programs. These rules, or
"tariffs," set compensation, describe program parameters, explain any testing
and eligibility requirements, describe the notice the utility will provide of
demand response "events," and explain how a customer's load drop will be
calculated.85
Congress has been light-handed in this area, with statutes marked by
hortatory language but requiring little in the way of action. Meanwhile, states
have been slow to adopt and regulate demand response programs of their
own. This has left FERC with the problem of ambitious-sounding national
goals, on the one hand, and insufficient authority to achieve them, on the
other. The FPA is not expansive in its grant of federal power over electricity,
at least as compared with other areas of federal regulation. In addition, the
statute's so-called "bright-line test" for distinguishing areas of state and federal
regulation has been blurred by changes in the electricity grid and
technological innovations.8"
84. As noted above, in some cases, power is provided by municipal utilities, which are
regulated by the municipalities themselves, or cooperative utilities, which are regulated by a
cooperative board.
85. This is also known as establishing a customer's "baseline," or the amount of energy a
customer would have been consuming had they not been called upon to drop load.
86. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) ("Congress
meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction ... by making
FPC jurisdiction plenary and extending it to all wholesale sales in interstate commerce xcept
those which Congress has made explicitly subject to regulation by the States." (quoting FPC v. S.
Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 2 15-16 (1964)) ). Cases that have not obviously fallen on one side
or the other of this line include regulation of sales of energy that has moved in interstate
commerce that is bundled with sales of local distribution services, "net metering," the
phenomenon of selling some energy produced on-site back to the grid, and, most relevant to this
Article, the authority to permit retail customers to bid demand response services into wholesale
markets.
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FERC has taken a creative approach to this problem. Rejecting both the
option of leaving demand response in the hands of state and local regulators
and the option of challenging jurisdictional boundaries directly or seeking
new statutory authority, FERC has instead charted a middle course. This
approach, which might be termed "bypassing federalism," involves the use of
FERC's authority over sales of electricity for resale to create and develop
demand response programs at the wholesale level. These programs essentially
compete with state retail demand response programs and were designed to
allow retail customers to participate in either market.
A. SUII-DEI?_AL RPEGIJA7ION
State and local regulators have been uneven in their support for, and
regulation of, energy efficiency programs generally and demand response
programs in particular. As a report by Columbia's Center for Climate Change
Law noted, "there is a great disparity among the [public utility commissions]
of various states in the extent to which energy efficiency policies are being
pursued."8 7 The report noted that 20 states with energy efficiency programs
were responsible for 85% of spending in this area.
8 8
Utilities' demand response program offerings are also uneven.89 Each
utility determines its own program rules, including eligibility for
participation, method of calculating and reporting load drop, compensation,
and penalties for non-performance. These rules are included in the utility's
tariff (a schedule of the utility's rates and charges) and must be approved by
the state public utilities commission or the relevant local regulator.
State regulations for demand response also vary widely, with some states
more active than others. California, often a first mover in the energy and
environmental space, is ahead of the curve. For example, in 2009, the
California Public Utilities Commission set a baseline calculation methodology
for demand response by regulation.g In April 2012, the Commission issued a
decision adopting demand response activities and budgets for 2012 through
87. COLUMBIA LAW SCI . CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, PUBI',LIC UTILIYCOMMISSONSAND
ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL & REGULATORY TOOLS FOR COMMISSIONERS AND
ADVOCATES I 2 (2012), available at http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/uploads/I/PUC
HandbookAugust_201 2.pdf.
88. Id. (citing Michael Dworkin et al., A Driving Need, a Vital Tool: The Rebirth of Efficiency
Programs fos Electric Consumers, in CAPTURING THE POWER OF ELECFRIC RESTRUCI'URING 226 (Joey
Lee Miranda ed., 2009)).
89. The DOE keeps a list of demand response programs by state. See Energy Incentive
Programs, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/energy-incentive-programs
(last visitedJan. 2 1, 2015).
9
o . Decision Adopting Demand Response Activities and Budgets for 2oo9 Through 20 1
at 2, Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U338E) for Approval of Demand Response Programs,
Goals & Budgets for 2009-2001, Decision No. o9-o8-027 (Cal. P.U.C. Aug. 20, 2oo9), available
at http://www.calmac.org/events/i o6oo8.pdf.
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2014 for the state's three large investor-owned utilities.9' Also in April 2012,
Governor Jerry Brown signed Executive Order B-i8-12, directing state
agencies to participate in demand response programs so long as they are cost
effective.9'2 Many states, however, have done very little, and some states have
made negative progress by prohibiting aggregators from bidding retail
customer demand response into wholesale markets.9:
This decentralized, experimental approach has had concrete advantages.
Demand response programs can be put in place relatively quickly by the
utilities without the necessity of centralized coordination and review. In
addition, utility and RTO/ISO experimentation with program structure and
rules have highlighted best practices, as well as pitfalls to avoid.94 But
decentralized experimentation also comes with costs. First, demand response
program deployment has been uneven, with some states offering incentives
for program creation and others limiting program development. Second,
there has been limited opportunity for standardization of technologies and
systems with each utility designing its own program rules and participation
requirements. Demand response aggregators must learn new rules for each
market and cater to those markets' idiosyncrasies. This lack of consistency
increases the costs, on the utility side, of program creation and, on the
customer side, of program participation. Crucial areas for standardization
include communications as well as measurement and verification of load
drop. Decentralization without adequate coordination also limits learning
from best practices. Third, because demand response can be achieved by
substituting behind-the-meter generation for grid power, it can also create
unanticipated environmental externalities. To date, the decentralized
approach has resulted in uneven regulation of these externalities.
91. DEMAND RESPONSE MEASUREMENT & EVALUATION COMM., PROCESS EVALUATION PLAN
PY 2012-2014(2012), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/72 226 4 4 F-gFE2- 4 4
DA-AD2 7 -o9 D2 7 3 13 AA8 2/o/DRMECprocessevaluationplan 2o 122 014redacted.pdf. The three
major investor-owned utilities in California are Pacific Gas & Electric ("PG&E") in Northern
California and Southern California Edison ("SCE") and San Diego Gas & Electric ("SDG&E") in
Southern California.
92. SeeCal. Exec. Order No. B-I 8-12 (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.
php?id= 17508.
93. See, e.g., Smart Grid Report and Order Continuing Prohibition of ARCs at 2, In rePURPA
Standards in the Energy Independence & Sec. Act of 2007, No. NOI-o8-3 (Iowa Dep't of
Commerce Utils. Bd., June 25, 2012), available at https://efs.iowa.gov/cs/groups/external/
documents/docket/mdaw/mtqz/-edisp/ I 1780.pdf (prohibiting aggregators from operating
in Iowa and prohibiting aggregators or retail customers from bidding retail demand response
loads into wholesale markets).
94. For example, PJM learned that a certain baseline calculation methodology it had used
in its capacity demand response program did not allow it adequately to predict peak demand in
the system and subsequently revised the methodology. See Order Conditionally Accepting
Compliance Filing, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 138 FERC 61,138 (2012) (No. ER I -332 2-
oo ), available at http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20 I 2022419 5 "22o-ER1 1-33 2 2-00 1 .pdf.
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B. FEDERAL LEGISLA TIVE EFFORTS
Congress has been ambitious in its goals for reducing electricity demand,
although it has been reluctant to provide federal agencies with the tools they
need to accomplish those goals. Rather than clarifying or altering the existing
state-federal balance, Congress has left in place the once-bright-line test in the
FPA between state regulation of retail electricity and federal regulation of
"wholesale" electricity, or the sale of electricity for resale.95 Because of this
limitation, when it comes to retail demand response programs, Congress has
required only that states "consider" various changes to the status quo.96
Congress showed little interest of any kind in demand-side management
until the 197os. As so often happens, it took a catastrophe to spur legislation,97
and in that decade Congress enacted a slew of federal energy bills in the wake
of the OPEC oil embargo and ensuing oil crises.9 In the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975, Congress required the Federal Energy
Administrator to set energy efficiency standards for appliances and offered
technical and financial assistance to the states to support energy conservation
plans.99 In PURPA, Congress continued to encourage conservation through
utility rate structure design, interruptible load programs, and other load-
management practices. PURPA also requires state Public Utility Commissions
("PUCs") to "consider" pricing energy based on its actual cost.'"0
Despite the progress of the 1970s, when the oil crisis subsided, Congress
refocused its attention on other priorities, and the next federal effort to
encourage demand-side management did not come for over ten years. In the
95. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
96. Id. § 2621 (a). In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, for example, Congress required that
states investigate and decide whether to require utilities to adopt metering and communications
devices to enable demand response programs. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,
§ 12 5 2 (b) (3), 1 19 Stat. 594,965 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.). Echoing this
approach, DOE's 2oo6 report to Congress indicated that "[s]tates should consider aggressive
implementation of price-based demand response for retail customers as a high priority." 2oo6
DOE Report, supra note 2, at v.
97. I have written elsewhere about the crisis legislation phenomenon in the context of food
and drug legislation. See generally Sharon B. Jacobs, Crises, Congress, and Cognitive Biases: A Critical
Examination of Food and Drug Legislation in the United States, 64 FOO) & DRUG LJ. 599 (2009).
98. This legislation included the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, the
Geothermal Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1974, the Solar Heating
and Cooling Demonstration Act of 1974, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, the
Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act, the National Energy Conservation
Policy Act of 1978, the Energy Tax Act of 1978, and the National Energy Act of 1978, which
included the Natural Gas Policy Act and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA").
99. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, §§ 3, 3 61 (b), 89 Stat.
871, 874, 933 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (2012)).
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012). The consideration requirement was challenged as a
violation of the Tenth Amendment, but was upheld by the Supreme Court in FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982), as a permissible exercise of federal power.
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Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress sought to address the incentives for
utilities to sell as much energy as possible. It promoted retail electric rate
policies that would make investments in conservation at least as profitable for
utilities as investments in generation.ol The Act also continued the trend of
providing financial and technical assistance to state PUCs to encourage
creative rate design.-o
The first federal legislative use of the term "demand response" occurred
more than a decade later in the Energy Policy Act of 20oo5.'3 The Act
announced that:
It is the policy of the United States that . . . demand response,
whereby electricity customers are provided with electricity price
signals and the ability to benefit by responding to them, shall be
encouraged, the deployment of such technology and devices that
enable electricity customers to participate in such pricing and
demand response systems shall be facilitated, and unnecessary
barriers to demand response participation in energy, capacity and
ancillary service markets shall be eliminated.'04
Congress also addressed state demand response programs, noting that
"[i] t is the policy of the United States to encourage States to coordinate, on a
regional basis, State energy policies to provide reliable and affordable
demand response services to the public."°5 The Act required state regulatory
authorities to investigate whether utilities should provide time-based metering
and communications devices to enable demand response programs., o6 The
DOE was also tasked with providing technical assistance to states and regional
organizations to facilitate increased development of, and participation in,
demand response programs,10 7 as well as encouraging the deployment of
demand response enabling devices.Os Finally, the Act required the DOE to
work with states, utilities, and other stakeholders to identify barriers to
demand response programs and to submit a report within six months
101. SeeEnergy PolicyAct of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 11, io6 Stat. 2776, 2795 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. 13201 (2012)). The rate structures were also designed to protect the
activities of small businesses involved in energy conservation goods and services. See id.
102. See id. § 112(a).
103. See Energy Policy Act of 2 005, Pub. L. No. 1o9-58, § 125 2, 1 19 Stat. 594,965 (codified
as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.). A 2004 Government Accountability Office report found
that the federal government could save millions if federal buildings were to participate in demand
response programs, but that active participation in reliability-based programs was "somewhat
limited." See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o4 -84 4 , ELECTRiCITY MARKETS:
CONSUMERS COULD BENEFIT FROM DEMAND PROGRAMS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 12 (2oo4).
104. SeeEnergy Policy Act of 2005 § 1252(f).
105. Id. § 1252(e).
i o6. Id. § 1252 (a)-(b). The Act set a two-year time limit for state regulatory authorities to
complete this consideration. Id. § 1254(b).
107. See id. § 1252(e).
io8. Id. § 12 5 2(f).
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identifying and quantifying the benefits of demand response and making
recommendations for how to achieve those benefits.o9 Again, however, the
actual decision about whether to pursue demand response programs was left
in state hands.
To satisfy its mandate under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the DOE
produced a report in 2oo6 on the benefits of demand response and how those
benefits could be achieved.I° The report was cautiously optimistic,
concluding that reliability-based demand response had begun to mature since
2ooo and also noting the increasing success of third-party aggregators."'
Despite the congressional mandate, the report declined to quantify benefits
from demand response, concluding that it was impossible to do so without
accepted analytical methods and that benefits would vary by region. 12
Nevertheless, the DOE anticipated that those benefits would be significant,
with gross benefits in the range of $1 million to $52 billion."3
The report recommended that state regulatory authorities and electric
utilities "consider" offering incentive-based programs but stressed the
importance of including methods to measure and verify performance,
especially for emergency demand response."4 Similarly, RTO/ISO and utility
representatives interviewed that year endorsed growth in demand response
programs "provided that [demand response resources] can live up to
expectations.""5 This qualification expresses the still-present concerns about
whether demand resources can be as reliable as generation resources.
In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Congress's
rhetoric was again more powerful than its actions. The Act stated that "[i] t is
the policy of the United States to . . . achieve . . . [d]evelopment and
incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, and energy-
efficiency resources."",6 However, the legislation's more specific provisions on
demand response primarily authorized research-based projects.' ,7 Congress
1o9. Id. § 1252(d).
i1o. See generally 2oo6 DOE REPORT, supra note 2.
Ill . Id. at 56 , 8o-82
112. Id. at vii. The relevant regional variables identified in the report included the character
of the market (size, competitiveness, geography, the cost of electricity, and price elasticities); a
region's peak demand; the demand response mechanism selected; and the time horizon of the
benefits evaluation. See id. at xv-xvii.
113. Id. at 44.
114. Id. at 51.
115. Nicole Hopperet al., The Summer of 2oo6: A Milestone in the Ongoing Maturation of Demand
Response, ELECTRICITYJ., June 2007, at 62, 70.
sI6. Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 1o-14o, § 1301, 121 Stat.
1492, 1784 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)..
117. In addition to the FERC and DOE reporting obligations described in this Part, Congress
also gave the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") responsibility for
coordinating interoperability standards for smart grid devices and standards, in part to enable
demand-side resources to "contribute to an efficient, reliable electricity network." Id. § 1305. Any
standards generated, however, would be voluntary. Congress further required the DOE to
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directed FERC to undertake a three-step process to study and implement
measures to encourage demand response."5s First, FERC was to conduct a
"National Assessment of Demand Response" byJune 19, 2009, in which it was
to estimate national demand response potential over the coming decade, note
any barriers to demand response programs, and provide recommendations
for overcoming those barriers.,,9 FERC was to follow the Assessment with a
"National Action Plan on Demand Response" to identify requirements for
technical assistance to the states, design a national communications plan to
promote demand response, and develop tools and other support material for
use by customers, states, utilities, and demand response providers.120 Finally,
the Act directed FERC and DOE, together, to submit a proposal for
implementing the National Action Plan to Congress.121
FERC submitted its National Assessment of Demand Response to
Congress on June 17, 2009, two days ahead of schedule. The Assessment
identified huge potential for expansion of demand response programs,
especially for small residential customers, since existing programs were
dominated by large commercial and industrial customers.12 2 Evaluating four
possible scenarios, from business as usual to full participation, FERC
concluded that peak load could be reduced by as much as 15o gigawatts
("GW"), which is equivalent to the load from 2000 peaking power plants.123
The following year, FERC submitted its National Action Plan ("Action
Plan") for Demand Response.124 Surveying the country, FERC found "little to
no influence" of demand response in 40 of the 50 states.1 5 FERC therefore
identified three main objectives to increase the penetration of demand
response. First, FERC recommended "technical assistance to States" to create
develop smart grid technology that was capable of measuring load reductions for demand
response and to study the ability of demand response to provide ancillary grid services. Id. § 1304.
DOE was also required to undertake smart grid demonstration initiatives that would, among
other things, demonstrate the effect of demand response on energy savings and fossil fuel
reductions. Id.
1 18. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 also took steps to improve data
collection in energy markets, including "data on demand response," by the Energy Information
Administration ("EIA"). Id. § 8o 5 (a) (2)(B).
119. Id.§ 5 71(a).
120. Id. § 5 7 1 (b).
121. Id. § 571 (c). Congress authorized a maximum of $1o,ooo,ooo per year for fiscal years
2oo8, 2oo9, and 2010 to implement these measures. Id. § 5 7 1 (d)
122. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE
POTENTIAL (2oo9), available at http://ww.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/o6-o9 -demand-response.pdf.
123. Id. at ix-x.
124. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON DEMAND RESPONSE
(2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL ACTION PLAN], available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/t6-17-1o-demand-response.pdf. Under the statute, the National Action Plan was to be
issued no later than one year after the Assessment. Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007
§ 5 7 1 (b). FERC met this deadline, but only just, issuing the Plan on June 17, 201o. NATIONAL
ACTION PLAN, supra.
125. NATIONAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 124, at 5.
[Vol. lOO:885
BYPASSING FEDERALISM
and expand demand response programs, primarily in the form of expert
consultations, research support, and grants.126 Next, FERC recommended the
creation of a national communications program for customer education and
support.' 2 7 Finally, FERC suggested that the federal government, in
cooperation with the states, create a clearinghouse of "analytical tools,
information, model regulatory provisions, model contracts, and other support
materials for use by customers, States, utilities, and demand response
providers.""28 FERC also suggested that communications and signaling
infrastructure could be included in this clearinghouse in order to promote
standardization across demand response programs.129
A year later, FERC and DOE jointly fulfilled EISA's final requirement by
filing their Implementation Proposal.13° Congress anticipated that the
Proposal would include "specific proposed assignments of responsibility,
proposed budget amounts, and any agreements secured for participation
from State and other participants.",3' In contrast to the Assessment and
Action Plan, however, the Implementation Proposal was short (the body of
the report was only 14 pages long), contained few true proposals, and in
general was pessimistic about the federal government's ability to implement
the Action Plan.132 Indeed, the report recognized that "not every element of
th[e] plan may be implemented" given the need for cooperation from sub-
federal government bodies and private actors.,33
The Action Plan suggested that federal agencies provide a forum for
meetings of a coalition of stakeholders, although FERC and DOE declined to
join the coalition.'134 Because they found that there were an adequate number
of existing experts on demand response, the agencies saw no need to identify
an expert panel as suggested in the National Action Plan.,35 In terms of
funding, the Implementation Proposal noted that ARRA had already
provided $4 billion for smart grid projects and that no additional federal
funding for demand response was necessary. ,36 The agencies also saw only a
limited federal role in designing and implementing the public
communications strategy, suggesting that a private sector coalition should
126. Id. at ES-ito - 3 , 29-32.
127. Id. at ES-3 to -4.
128. Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 65-66.
130. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSAL
FOR THE NATIONAL AcrION PLAN ON DEMAND RESPONSE (2011) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION
PROPOSAL], available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/o7-1i -dr-action-plan.pdf.
131. Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11o-140, § 571 (c), 121 Stat.
1492, 1665 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
132. See IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSAL, supra note 130.
133. Id. at iii.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id. at 9-1o.
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take the lead in this area.'7 FERC and DOE did, however, pledge to look at
maintaining a clearinghouse for standards, tools, and materials related to
demand response, but they declined to endorse any of the material
supplied.138
The only legislative developments since 2007 have related to tax credits
and other funding. The 2009 Recovery Act provided $4.5 billion for smart
grid investments, "to include demand responsive equipment."139 Demand
response program infrastructure is also eligible for tax incentives such as the
investment tax credit for advanced energy manufacturing.4o Other than these
financial incentives, however, Congress has been silent with respect to
demand response.
C. BYPASSING FEDERALISM
Notwithstanding the absence of comprehensive federal legislation, FERC
has identified demand response as a "major priority."'41 Yet it has become
frustrated with what it sees as inadequate state progress in developing demand
response programs.,42 FERC is limited in its ability to promote demand
response by the jurisdictional divides in the Federal Power Act and the
absence of new legislation providing explicit federal authority in this area.
Faced with these limits, FERC had several options. First, it could do nothing.
Agencies are, after all, creatures of statute, and as faithful agents of the
enacting Congress, we might think they should abide by both the letter and
the spirit of statutory allocations of jurisdiction (presuming, of course, that
those allocations are discernible), even if it prevents them from achieving
national goals. At the other end of the spectrum, FERC could seek to adjust
federalism boundaries, either by taking more aggressive action than the
statute appears to permit and fighting the issue out in court, or by lobbying
137. Id. at 1o-1i.
138. Id. at 13-15. The DOE ultimately decided to wrap a clearinghouse for demand
response information into its Smart Grid Information Clearinghouse. The Clearinghouse
contains a large quantity of information, but its utility as a resource for program designers and
regulators is limited by the sheer volume of material and the absence of executive summaries,
templates, and model provisions.
139. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2oo9, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115,
138 (codified as amended in scattered tides of U.S.C.). Of the $4-5 billion, approximately $3.4
billion was designated for investment grants, $615 million for demonstration projects, $soo
million for worker training, $8o million for regional transmission planning, and $s o million for
NIST interoperability standards. Id.
140. For program rules, see QualifyingAdvanced Energy Project Credit (section 4 8C), IRS, http://
www.irs.gov/Businesses/Qualifying-Advanced-Energy-Project-Credit-section-4 8C (last updated
Feb. 21, 2014).
141. Energy Bar Association General Counsel Roundtable, 31 ENERGYL.J. 371, 374 (2010).
142. See, e.g., Guest Interview with Chairman Jon Wellinghoff (EERC), ASS'N FOR DEMAND
RESPONSE & SMART GRID, http://www'demandresponsesrnartgrid'org/page-I 3341 26 (last visited
Jan. 21, 2015) ("It can be frustrating when certain states believe that consumers shouldn't have
choices and shouldn't be able to choose to participate in the wholesale DR markets.").
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Congress for a legislative fix. FERC's approach fell in between these two poles.
Instead of accepting the status quo or pushing aggressively for change, it
adopted a middle approach that might be called "bypassing federalism."
"Bypassing federalism" involves using clear jurisdictional authority to
achieve policy aims without engaging jurisdictional boundaries directly. An
agency seeking to bypass federalism allocations is attempting to work a de
facto, rather than a de jure, reallocation of power. It does so by maximizing
its influence within its designated sphere in the hopes that its actions will have
effects beyond the area of its immediate control.
In the demand response context, FERC has bypassed federalism
allocations by exploiting its jurisdiction over wholesale electricity to create
and manage incentive-based demand response programs in regional
wholesale markets. The creation of these programs has been incremental. In
Order 693, FERC required the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation ("NERC"), the organization that ensures electric grid reliability,
to include demand response resources as tools for the management of
emergencies.143 FERC also clarified the role of demand response in
transmission planning in Order 89o.144 FERC then took two more dramatic
steps to encourage demand response in wholesale markets in Order 7 19 and
Order 745145
First, relying on its authority under the FPA, rather than the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 or EISA,,46 on October 17, 2oo8, FERC issued Order 719,
which required RTOs and ISOs to accept bids from aggregators of retail
customer demand response "on a basis comparable to other resources."'47
143. Final Rule at 168-69, Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power Systems, i18
FERC 61,218 (2007) (No. RMo6-i6-ooo), available at http://energylegalblog.com/files/RM
o6-16%2oReliability%2oStandards% 2oOrder.pdf.
144. See generally Final Rule, Preventing Undue Discrimination & Preference in Transmission
Service, 118 FERC 61,119 (2007) (Nos. RMo 5-17-000, RMo 5-25 -OOO), availableathttp://www.
nerc.com/files/order_89o.pdf.
145. See generally Final Rule, Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale
Energy Markets, 134 FERC 61,187 (2011) (No. RM1o-17-ooo) [hereinafter Order 745],
available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/2o1lo315io5 7 5 7-RM'o-17-ooo.pdf;
Final Rule, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electricity Markets, 125 FERC
61,071 (2oo8) (Nos. RMo7-19-ooo, ADo7-7-ooo) [hereinafter Order 719], available at http://
www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2oo8/1o1 6o8/E-i .pdf.
146. Under the FPA, FERC must ensure that wholesale rates for electricity are just and
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory. See Order 719, supra note 145, at 9 (noting that new
rules would result in tariffs that better reflect "the value customers place on electric power" and
"remedy any undue discrimination and preference in organized markets" per Commission
responsibility under FPA 205 and 2o6).
147. Id. at 2-3. Order 719 also required that RTOs and ISOs accept bids from demand
response providers in their ancillary services markets, which deal in sales of small amounts of
energy (or, in this case, reductions in demand) in close to real time to balance out any
fluctuations in power and voltage that might otherwise disrupt the flow of electricity. Id. at 27.
The Order further required that RTOs and ISOs study whether eliminating barriers to demand
response in wholesale markets required further reforms. Id. at 2-3, 51-52.
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The Order gave retail customers access to the more lucrative demand
response programs in wholesale energy markets. However, this access came
with a significant caveat: aggregators could not bid customer demand
response into these markets if "the laws or regulations of the relevant electric
retail regulatory authority d[id] not permit a retail customer to participate."148
FERC's approach to the jurisdictional question might best be described as
prudent.'49 Under the FPA, FERC arguably has authority to require RTOs and
ISOs to accept bids from aggregators of retail customers' demand response
services over the objections of state regulators. FERC Commissioner Jon
Wellinghoff and FERC Acting General Counsel David Morenoff offered
several alternative justifications that would support such authority in a 2007
article.,5o However, Wellinghoff and Morenoff conclude in their article, and
FERC concluded in its final rule, that setting up a jurisdictional showdown
with the states would not be likely to advance the cause of demand response.'5'
148. Id. at 311-12. To mitigate the burden on smaller utilities, FERC prohibited
participation by customers of utilities below a certain size threshold unless the relevant regulatory
authority affirmatively permitted it, thereby effectively moving from an "opt-out" to an "opt-in"
for these customers. Order on Rehearing at 14, Wholesale Competition in Regions with
Organized Electricity. Markets, 128 FERC 61,059 (2009) (No. RMo 7-19-ooi), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2009/o7i6o9/E- i .pdf.
149. Indeed, FERC's own justification for this compromise sounds in pragmatism. See Order
719, supra note 145, at 84-85 ("[W]e find that this action properly balances the Commission's
goal of removing barriers to development of demand response resources in the organized
markets that we regulate with the interests and concerns of state and local regulatory
authorities.").
150. Wellinghoff and Morenoff identify five potential sources of FERC jurisdiction. First,
they argue, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directly authorizes the Commission to promote demand
response. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 7, at 397-98. Second, they claim that the
Commission must regulate demand response in order to fulfill its mandates under the FPA to
ensure that wholesale electricity rates are "just and reasonable" and to prevent "undue
discrimination." Id. at 396, 399-401, 4o8-1o; see also Paddock & Youngblood, supra note 8o, at
166 ("This non-discrimination concept is today emerging in FERC orders that address
requirements to treat demand response in certain circumstances in the same manner as [utilities]
would treat conventional generation sources."). Third, they conclude, the FPA gives FERC
jurisdiction over any "rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting [public utility] rate, charge,
or classification." 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012). Demand response could be characterized as such
a practice. Wellinghoff& Morenoff, supra note 7, at 399-401 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2000)).
Fourth, they argue that demand response's impact on system reliability places it within the
Commission's jurisdiction. Id. at 401-12. Finally, Wellinghoff and Morenoff argue that, "to the
extent that demand response can be characterized as involving [] a wholesale sale of electric
energy [in interstate commerce], it would fall within the Commission's jurisdiction under the
FPA." Id. at 405. Note that, although the Commission made this last argument in 2001 during
the California energy crisis, see Removing Obstacles to Increased Electric Generation and Natural
Gas Supply in the Western United States and Requesting Comments on Further Actions to
Increase Energy Supply and Decrease Energy Consumption, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,858 (Mar. 21, 2001)
[hereinafter Removing Obstacles], Wellinghoff and Morenoff appeared to distance themselves
from it in their article.
151. Although FERC did not extend its authority as far as it might have in Order 719, states
and local regulators were still concerned about what they saw as unlawful encroachment on their
jurisdiction. In comments on the rule, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
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In a second, bolder step three years later, FERC sought to make
participation in demand response programs more lucrative and therefore
more attractive. In Order 745, noting that "a market functions effectively only
when both supply and demand can meaningfully participate," FERC ruled
that demand response resources in wholesale markets should be paid the
market price for energy, also known as the locational marginal price
("LMP").-52 The Order has been a lightning rod for opponents of demand
response, and a coalition of power suppliers and cooperatives challenged the
rule in the D.C. Circuit.'15 Petitioners contended that FERC exceeded its
jurisdiction under the FPA and acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the
Administrative Procedure Act when it adopted the compensation scheme.,54
Petitioners further contended that Order 745 over-compensates demand
response resources. Those resources, petitioners argue, are in effect being
compensated twice: not only do they save the retail cost of energy they chose
not to consume, they also receive a payment equal to the market price for that
energy.55
Notwithstanding a recent D.C. Circuit panel decision vacating and
remanding Order 745, 56 the impact of FERC's efforts in Orders 719 and 745
cannot be overstated. In the space of just a few years, FERC created a new,
lucrative market for retail demand response providers, effectively bypassing
the FPA's statutory constraints. Prior to the D.C. Circuit ruling, the strategy
had proven largely successful: between 2010 and 2012, available demand
response capacity grew by nearly 13,000 megawatts ("MW").,57 Wholesale
("NRECA") argued that the Order would hurt retail demand response programs because
aggregators would "cherry pick" the best loads from retail programs and bid them into the more
lucrative wholesale markets. Order 719, supra note 145, at 76 (citing NRECA comments).
Commenters also raised concerns about possible interference with state resource planning, the
burden incumbent on RERRAs to affirmatively opt-out of participation, and the allegedly
dangerous precedent the Order set for the expansion of federal power over traditionally state
areas of regulation. See, e.g., id. at 77 (alleging that the Order "violates the separation of federal
and state jurisdiction").
152. Order 745, supra note 145, at 1-3. FERC added a caveat, however. Demand resources
would only receive the LMP for reductions in consumption when a "net benefits" test, designed
to indicate when "the overall benefit from the reduced LMP resulting from dispatching demand
response resources exceeds the cost of dispatching and paying LMP to those resources", was met.
Id. at4.
153. See generally Brief for Petitioners, Elec. Power SupplyAss'n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (No. 11-1486), 20t2 WL 2048483.
154. Id. at 22-23.
155. Id. at 47-50. Oral argument was held in late September before Judges Edwards and
Brown and Senior Judge Silberman. The two questions before the panel were whether FERC
exceeded its authority in enacting Order 745 and whether its compensation scheme was arbitrary
and capricious. The panel spent the bulk of its time on the first question.
156. See Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 753 F.3d 216.
157. By way of comparison, the wind industry also added 13,000 MW of installed capacity
between 201 1 and 2012. SeeRYAN WISER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 2012 WIND TECHNOLOGIES
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demand response programs were responsible for nearly half of that growth.'58
Uncertainty now exists surrounding the strategy's future, and the panel's
ruling may well stymie demand response in wholesale markets. While the D.C.
Circuit denied FERC's request for rehearing, the government has opted to
petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.'s9 Even if the D.C.
Circuit's ruling stands, FERC's efforts over the past several years have had a
lasting impact on the development of demand response in this country. By
stimulating a market for demand response, FERC contributed to the
development of a mature industry for demand response services and better
understanding of the trade-offs involved in demand response program
implementation. Together, those contributions may result in more robust
demand response programs at the state level.
III. EVALUATING BYPASSING
By "bypassing" federalism, FERC has been able to promote and develop
demand response programs without the necessity of statutory amendment. In
today's era of divided government, in which Congress legislates rarely and
consensus is difficult to achieve, we should not be surprised that federal
agencies are turning to creative ways of accomplishing objectives where old
statutes stand in the way of solving new problems.'6" The need is especially
great when the states fail to exercise their own residual authority, resulting in
a regulatory gap.
The academic literature on federalism is both broad and deep.'6' Unlike
the existing literature, however, this Article is concerned neither with
MARKET REPORT 3 (2013), available at http://wwwi.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/2o12_wind
technologies market-report.pdf.
158. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, 2012 ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE &
ADVANCED METERING 21-25 (2012).
159. Elec. PowerSupply Ass'n, 753 F.3d at 225. The D.C. Circuit has stayed the issuance of its
mandate in Elec. Power Supply Ass'n pending the outcome of the government's petition for a writ
of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16.
i6o. For additional examples of this phenomenon, see generally Freeman & Spence, supra
note 1 (coining the phrase "Old States, New Problems").
161. The literature may be roughly divided into works on structural federalism (what our
federalism actually looks like and the wisdom of its design) and policy or "values" federalism
(given a range of constitutionally permissible choices, how authority should be allocated between
various levels of government). Articles in the former category tend to focus on the Constitution
and on judicial doctrine interpreting its edicts. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (exploring the Constitutional origins of federalism and
explaining federalism's role in the protection of individual rights); Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (inspiring a mini-literature of its own). Pieces in the latter category
tend to focus more on specific policymaking domains and on the values implicated by particular
allocations of authority. Again, the examples are too numerous to catalog, but they include works
such as William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974) (calling for uniform federal standards in regulation of corporations to avoid forum
shopping and ultra-lax state regulation); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
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investigating the essential structural features of our federalist system nor with
identifying the "best" allocation of power between the states and the federal
government in the area of electricity regulation. Rather, this Article accepts
as given FERC's determination to assert greater federal control over demand
response programs and evaluates the particular strategy it used to accomplish
this goal.
There are several reasons to conclude that bypassing is a troubling
strategy, both as a general matter and in the specific context of electricity
demand reduction programs. First, bypassing can result in the promotion of
a solution that might not have emerged as a legislative winner. Like all
federalization strategies that substitute a unified approach for a more
decentralized one, bypassing risks crowding out useful experimentation by
states. But bypassing poses greater problems in this regard than does statutory
preemption: while Congress may choose from a broad menu of policies when
it legislates, federal agencies seeking to proceed within the constraints of
existing legislation have more limited options. This problem has plagued
FERC's efforts to regulate electricity demand. Although bypassing has been
helpful in standardizing elements within demand response programs, it has
also had the less salutary effect of crowding out programs that encourage
permanent, rather than temporary, demand reductions.
Second, any reallocation of power by a federal agency might be
characterized as an unacceptable end run around the legislative process. This
objection is strengthened in the federalism context, where we might be
particularly concerned that Congress and the President decide jurisdictional
questions through legislation. Unlike actual federal-state preemption, of
course, the bypassing strategy works no de jure legal intrusion on state
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1210 (1 992) (questioning the theory that interstate competition will always lead to sub-optimally
weak regulatory control and that federal regulation is preferable). A sub-category of policy
federalism explores and evaluates innovative power arrangements. See, e.g.,Jessica Bullmars-Pozen
& Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, s 18 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (exploring state use of
delegated federal authority to challenge federal programs from within).
For exploration of federalism questions in the context of energy law, see generally Alexandra
B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism
Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 18oi (2012) (discussing the pathologies of state control over
transmission siting and suggesting solutions including limited federal preemptive authority and
greater regional coordination); Hari M. Osofsky & HannahJ. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism,
72 MD. L. REV. 773 (2013) (describing energy governance as "fractured" and identifying regional
governance mechanisms as the most promising solution); David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory
Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2013) (concluding that
traditional federalism considerations support the regulation of hydraulic fracturing at the state
level); Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REv. 217 (2012) (arguing that
states have retained authority over the siting of electric generation facilities because federal
interests are adequately represented in the process).
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prerogatives.162 However, the de facto effects of bypassing raise functional
federalism concerns.
Third, bypassing strategies might not avoid costly court battles if agencies
are too aggressive in implementing them. While FERC largely avoided
problematic legal challenges to Order 719, which allowed retail participation
in wholesale demand response programs, it has been drawn into a protracted
legal battle over Order 745's pricing scheme for economic demand response.
More problematic still for FERC is that the D.C. Circuit panel reviewing Order
745 also took the opportunity to invalidate the jurisdictional basis for the
pricing scheme. While the immediate effects of the order are only on the
market for economic demand response products rather than emergency or
capacity products, and while FERC is seeking review of the order by the
Supreme Court, its aggressive stance on pricing may ultimately have put its
larger demand response strategy in jeopardy.
Finally, bypassing can actually create a disincentive for congressional
action since, by making archaic statutory provisions more functional, it masks
the need for legislative amendment. Although Congress is unlikely to adjust
the federalism boundaries in the FPA any time soon, FERC's strategy might
be postponing less radical legislative solutions such as increased federal
support for energy efficiency programs.
A. SECOND-BEST SOLUTIONS
Were demand response programs the only option for regulating
electricity consumption, FERC's approach would be less problematic. This is
because more uniformity within demand response programs i desirable to
improve the quality of those programs and to make participation more
straightforward. However, demand response programs are not the only way to
incentivize demand-side reductions. Ideally, these programs should be part of
an "all of the above" strategy that includes incentives for energy efficiency and
time-of-use pricing. However, in part due to its unique jurisdictional position,
FERC has focused mainly on demand response, effectively crowding out these
other approaches. Bypassing has thus resulted in the selection of a policy that
might not have emerged as a legislative winner, especially in light of the fact
that demand response's conservation and environmental impacts are less
straight-forward than they are for energy efficiency programs.
i. Uniformity Within Demand Response
There are several reasons to think that more coordination within demand
response programs is desirable. We have over a decade of experience with
some of these programs and an increasing comfort level with the technologies
162. In expanding its demand response programs in wholesale markets, FERC has been
scrupulously careful not to challenge jurisdictional boundaries directly. See supra notes 141-45
and accompanying text.
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involved. Further, experimentation at the sub-federal level has yielded
sufficient information about regulatory strategies to identify best practices
that could inform a more comprehensive approach to demand response.
The generic term "demand response" papers over the fact that "the real-
world business of demand response is a highly fragmented affair, ranging
from cutting-edge . . . automation and communication technologies to old
stand-bys of pager messages, phone calls, emails and price lists posted on
public websites."'63 Greater uniformity is desirable in three areas. First,
terminology and communications should be standardized. Second, program
rules including testing requirements and methods for measuring and
verifying a customer's load drop should adhere to best industry practices.
Finally, penalties for violations should be strict enough to deter gaming and
to ensure that only serious customers with actual performance capability
participate in the market.
First, decentralized experimentation has produced a bewildering array of
different demand response programs, rules, and standards. FERC has
acknowledged that "[t]he rapid evolution of demand response programs,
rules, and names increases confusion among respondents and staff alike." 164
The sheer variety of programs and the accompanying diversity of program
terminology is an impediment to efficiencies in demand response. There are
ongoing efforts to develop a standardized communications language between
utilities and their customers that can be used to signal changes in the price of
electricity, the onset of a demand response event, and customer usage
information.'65 However, to date, this effort has been purely voluntary.
Another key area for standardization is the method for calculating
"negawatts" themselves (or, in other words, how much electrical load a
customer has actually dropped). Measurement and verification of a
customer's load drop is crucial to establish eligibility for demand response
programs, to confirm that a customer has dropped its load for purposes of
providing compensation, and to use as a basis for the program operator's
forecasting and planning.'66 Load drop is measured from a "baseline" of how
much energy the customer would have been consuming were it not called
163. Jeff St.John, Demand Response: The Standards Race Begins?, GREENTEcHGRID (Nov. 12, 20-9),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/demand-response-the-standards-race-begins.
164. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, 2010 ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE &
ADVANCED METERING 23 (2011).
165. One platform for automated demand response, OpenADR, has been adopted by
California's three large investor-owned utilities. Press Release, OpenADR Alliance, Leading
Utilities Embrace OpenADR 2.0 (Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.openadr.org/index.
php?option=com-Content&viewartice&id=68:leading-utiities-embrace-openadr-2-o&catid=2 1:
press-releases& Itemid= 1 2 1.
166. MIRIAM L. GOLDBERG & G. KENNEDY AGNEW, MEASUREMENT AND VERIFICATION FOR
DEMAND RESPONSE at viii (2013), available at http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/napdr-
measurement-and-verification.pdf.
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upon to reduce its usage.167 But coming up with this number has proven
difficult.
68
Many customers have a variable load, which means that they consume
different amounts of electricity depending on such factors as the time of day,
weather, and activities at the facility. For these customers, it can be difficult
to demonstrate how much energy they would have been using but for their
participation in the demand response program. A variety of methods to
establish baseline are used in wholesale and retail markets, including
averaging usage in the hours immediately before and after a demand
response event, using a historical average usage on similar days, and
measuring the amount of back-up generation used during the event. Within
each of these categories, safeguards can be put in place and adjustments made
to maximize accuracy and minimize the potential for gaming.
PJM, the transmission coordinator for the mid-Atlantic region, was one
of the earliest adopters of demand response programs and has led the field in
measurement and verification ("M&V"). It proposed several modifications to
the M&V protocols for its economic demand response program in 2oo8 after
concluding that its existing baseline rules were "susceptible to gaming."'69
PJM also produced a comprehensive empirical analysis of demand response
baseline methods in 201 1.170 However, although understanding of baseline
calculation methodologies has evolved considerably and certain pitfalls to
avoid have been identified, there are no baseline calculation requirements
that cut across retail and wholesale demand response programs. Thus, many
167. See Decision Adopting Demand Response Activities and Budgets for 2012-2014 at 2,
Application of Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (U 39E) for Approval of Demand Response Programs, supra
note 51, at 57. The importance of determining the correct customer baseline cannot be
overstated. Id. at 59. "An accurate baseline calculation helps determine the success of a DR
program. Overestimation leads to overpayment, but underestimation could potentially lead to
customer withdrawal from a DR program." Id.; Chao, supra note 6, at 8 (warning that if these
baseline problems are not properly addressed, demand response programs could be
counterproductive and deter "the development of efficient price-responsive demand," likely
making "the cure ... worse than the disease").
168. This problem, in some ways, parallels the "additionality" problem in calculating
reductions in carbon offset policy. There, as here, the problem is in establishing a baseline: what
reductions in emissions would have been achieved under a business-as-usual scenario? There is
widespread agreement that only additional savings beyond that baseline should be counted as
bona fide reductions. The question is how to define business-as-usual. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel,
Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches to Climate Change Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable
Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1563, 1598 n. 106 (2007) (noting
the problem of additionality and citing guidelines developed to determine business-as-usual
baseline).
169. Order Accepting Tariff Revisions, Subject to Conditions at 1-2, PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C.,12 3 FERC 61,257 (2oo8) (No. ERo8-824-ooo).
170. KEMA, PJMEMPIRICALANALYSIS OF DEMAND RESPONSE BASELINE METHODS (20 11). The
analysis considered 11 different baseline methodologies in use across wholesale markets and
concluded that certain baseline methodologies were demonstrably more accurate than others.
Id. at 5 .
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markets still do not benefit from our collective experience with these
programs.1 71
There has been some progress in standardization at the wholesale level.
FERC adopted model standards issued by the North American Energy
Standards Board ("NAESB") for measurement and verification in 201o and
updated those standards in February of last year.72 It noted that the use of
uniform standards would "improve the methods and procedures for
measuring accurately the performance of demand response resources and
assist in monitoring demand response services for potential manipulation."-73
However, these standards apply only to wholesale markets administered by
RTOs and ISOs.'74 Thus, the gains that FERC identifies that will flow from
standardization, including facilitating participation in demand response
markets, reducing transaction costs, and better evaluating resources'
performance, do not extend to retail demand response programs.'75
Further, retail baseline standards vary in method and in specificity.,7
6
This diversity of baseline calculation methodologies was more appropriate
171. FED. ENERGYREGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 122, at 66-67 ("Finally, development of
measurement and verification standards is critically needed at both the wholesale and retail
levels. Methods for measuring and verifying demand response reductions currently vary
significantly across the country, and measurement and verification standards will increase
confidence in markets.").
172. Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities, 75
Fed. Reg. 20,901 (Apr. 22, 2010) (to be codified as 18 C.F.R. pt. 38); Standards for Business
Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,654 (Mar. 7, 2013)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. Pt. 38). In the spirit of experimentalism, the final rule noted that the
new standards represented an "incremental improvement" over those adopted in 20iO and that
"it is appropriate to allow industry to gain additional experience with these new standards prior
to considering additional enhancements." Id. at 14,659, 14,661.
173. Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities, 75
Fed. Reg. at 20,90 1; see also FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 122, at 72 (remarking
that "development of standardized practices for quantifying demand reductions would greatly
improve the ability of system operators to rely on demand response programs of all kinds and
would minimize gaming opportunities").
174. Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities, 78
Fed. Reg. at 14,659 ("[T]he particular standards we are incorporating by reference in this Final
Rule apply only in organized wholesale electric markets administered by RTOs or ISOs."). In
addition, in the event of a conflict between the RTO's or ISO's governing documents and the
NAESB standards, the governing documents control. Id.
175. See Order Accepting Tariff Revisions, Subject to Conditions, supra note 169, at 12, 35
(discussing the benefits of uniform standards). There have also been some local and regional
efforts at increased standardization. For instance, the New England ISO ("NE-ISO") proposed
modifications to its baseline calculation methodologies in 2011 based, in part, on conclusions in
a study conducted by PJM.
176. See ENERNOC, THE DEMAND RESPONSE BASELINE 2 (201 1), available at http://www.
enernoc.com//themes/bluemasters/images/brochures/pdfs/4-ENRBR_- B5oo638-Demand_
ResponseBaseline_low_725.pdf (noting that "[a]lthough there are many methods currently in
use, some are much more accurate than others"). Compare DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC, RIDER
PSC (SC): POWERSHARE CALLOPTION NONRESIDENTIAL LOAD CURTAILMENT (2013), available at
https://www.duke-energy.com/pdfs/scriderpsc.pdf (using a measure of demand called the
20151
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when demand response was in its infancy than it is now. Sufficient learning
has taken place to allow regulators to standardize methodologies, or at least
place limits on the number of permissible methodologies, in order to curb
gaming in demand response programs.
Finally, there is unevenness in state penalties and enforcement regimes
for failures to comply with demand response commitments or for intentional
violations of program rules. Compliance is vital in demand response markets
both to ensure that program goals are met and to preserve public and
government support for demand response. If customers or aggregators bid
fictitious loads into the grid or manipulate their energy baselines, demand
response's pricing and reliability advantages are undercut. 77 Gaming not only
hurts individual demand response programs, it hurts demand response as an
industry because it undermines confidence in the technology.,7
Notwithstanding the importance of eliminating gaming, penalties for
noncompliance also vary from program to program. Some penalties are
relatively minor, as in MidAmerican Energy's program in Iowa, which assures
customers that "your share [of any added capacity purchased to cover the
shortfall] will never exceed your annual curtailment credit."'79 Some
companies even offer penalty-free programs.s° By contrast, in the Duke
"Proforma," which is "based on the Customer's historical load comparable to the period when
the Company declares an event"), with IND. MICH. POWER CO., SCHEDULE OF TARIFFS AND TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE GOVERNING SALE OF ELECTRICITY IN THE STATE OF INDIANA (20 13),
available at https://www.indianamichiganpower.com/global/uilities/lib/docs/ratesandtariffs/
Indiana/IMJIN TB s6_9-29-2o014.pdf (offering a detailed methodology that averages four out
of the five most recent similar non-event days).
177. See Susan Kelly & Elise Caplan, Time for a Day 1.5 Market: A Proposal to Reform RTO-RUN
Centralized Wholesale Electricity Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 491, 538 (2oo8) (noting that "sufficient
safeguards would have to be included in RTO tariffs to ensure that demand response resources
would indeed perform as promised at the time demanded if a demand response bid clears the
market. RTOs such as ISO New England are currently working on such criteria, to avoid the
phenomenon of "phantom" demand response resources").
178. One need only look at the media frenzy surrounding the collapse of solar company and
federal stimulus recipient Solyndra to conclude that a prominent instance of demand response
program gaming might cast a pall on the endeavor as a whole. See Editorial, The Solyndra Mess,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 201 1), http://www.nytimes.com/2o 1/11/25/opinion/the-solyndra-
mess.html?_r-o.
179. Energy Efficiency: Iowa, MIDAMERICAN ENERGY, http://www.midamericanenergy.com/
ee/ia.busjload.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (follow "What happens if I can't comply when
I'm asked to curtail?" hyperlink under Frequently Asked Questions No. 4).
18o. A survey of retail programs in the Midwestern ISO ("MISO") footprint found that nearly
2o% of programs surveyed did not have penalties for non-performance. See RANJIT BHARVIRKAR
ET AL., COORDINATION OF RETAIL DEMAND RESPONSE WITH MIDWEST ISO WHOLESALE MARKETS 23
(2oo8), available at http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/REPORT%2olbnl-288e.pdf (stating that
27 out of 141 DR programs have no penalties); see alsoAPS's DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAM, ARIZ.
PUB. SERV., available at https://www.azmag.gov/Documents/MC-o2-o3-14-Item-1oAPS-
Peak-Solutions-Demand-Response-Presentation.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,' 205) (advertising no
penalties or out of pocket expenses for customers). Some aggregators may also be willing to
mitigate the noncompliance charges for their customers to encourage participation.
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PowerShare program in North and South Carolina, noncompliant customers
forfeit their monthly credit and are charged i io% of the cost of that energy
per kilowatt-hour.'8'
Penalties for violations in wholesale markets are more serious. FERC has
aggressively policed potential violations of RTO/ISO demand response
program rules. The threat of FERC enforcement is a significant one in light
of the Commission's authority to assess up to $i million per day per violation
of its rules.lS2 FERC showed that it was not afraid to use this authority in several
recent investigations involving alleged violations relating to wholesale
demand response markets. These investigations, which resulted in large
settlements, show that the problem of gaming is not illusory.,83
Program diversity can be a virtue in experimental regulatory regimes, and
it has been beneficial to the development of demand response. However,
persistent lack of standardization and adoption of those best practices in
program design threatens to unravel the benefits of demand response
programs. Therefore, from the perspective of internal standardization,
FERC's bypassing strategy and attendant efforts to standardize demand
response programs are a step in the right direction.
181. See DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC, supra note 176, at 4.
182. See 16 U.S.C. § 82 50-1 (b) (2012).
183. The Commission secured over $500,000 in civil penalties and over $2 million in
disgorgement of unjust profits as part of a 2010 consent agreement following its investigation of
North American Power Partners, a demand response aggregator, and its Senior Vice President of
Operations, Joseph Polidoro. Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, N. Am.
Power Partners, 133 FERC 61,o89 (2010) (No. INo9-6-ooo), available at https://www.ferc.
gov/enforcement/civil-penalties/actions/13 3 FERC6i o89.pdf. Polidoro entered into a separate
consent agreement, agreeing to pay a $50,000 civil penalty and refrain from participation in the
PJM market for two years. See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, In rejoseph
Polidoro, 138 FERC 61,oi8 (2012) (No. INo 9-6-ool), available at http://www.ferc.gov/
enforcement/civil-penalties/actions/138FERC61o18.pdf. According to FERC, the penalties
could have been even higher were it not for the fact that a larger award might have threatened
the financial viability of the company. Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement,
supra, at 5.
In a second case, demand response aggregator and market leader EnerNOC agreed to pay a
penalty of $82o,ooo and disgorge $656,8o6 to resolve allegations that it overstated load drop
data for customers participating in the ISO-NE demand response programs. Order Approving
Stipulation and Consent Agreement, EnerNOC, Inc., 141 FERC 61,211 (2012) (No. IN1 3-6-
ooo), available at http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/civil-penalties/actions/IN 13-6-ooo.pdf.
Finally, in 2Ol 3, FERC approved Stipulation and Consent Agreements with two companies for
allegedly establishing false and inflated baselines from which to measure their energy
curtailment. Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement at 4, 25, Rumsford Paper Co.,
142 FERC 61,218 (2013) (No. IN 2-1 -ooo), available at http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/
civil-penalties/actions/a42FERC61218.pdf (requiring the company to disgorge nearly $ 3
million and to pay a civil penalty of $1o million); Order Approving Stipulation and Consent
Agreement, Enerwise Global Technologies, Inc., 143 FERC 61,218 (2013) (No. IN12-15-000),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/civil-penalties/actions/ 143FERC612 8.pdf (requiring
the company to disgorge nearly $21,ooo and to pay a civil penalty of $78o,ooo).
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2. Crowding Out Energy Efficiency
Despite the benefits of a more coordinated federal approach to demand
response programs themselves, however, FERC's bypassing strategy is
disadvantageous in that it risks promoting demand response at the expense
of other strategies for reducing consumer demand for electricity. Specifically,
there is a tension between customer participation in incentive-based emand
response programs and in energy efficiency programs. Energy efficiency
programs are particularly advantageous because they can ensure a net
reduction in demand over time, whereas demand response programs might
not. The environmental benefits of energy efficiency programs are also
clearer. In some cases, however, the competition between demand response
and energy efficiency is a zero sum game. Customers must choose between
reducing their energy consumption permanently as part of an energy
efficiency program or doing so on a temporary basis to participate in demand
response. While demand response programs will continue to play an
important role in mitigating peak electricity demand, those gains should not
be made at the expense of energy efficiency.
a. Conservation Trade-Offs
The DOE defines "energy efficiency" as "using less energy to provide the
same or improved level of service to the energy consumer in an economically
efficient way."'84 Utilities can promote energy efficiency in several ways. Some
utilities funnel money from utility customers into "public benefits funds" that
are used to promote energy efficiency by, for example, subsidizing energy
efficiency upgrades to existing buildings or investing in research and
development.'8s5 Regulators can also offer customers direct incentives to
purchase and install more energy efficient appliances8 6 or set energy savings
targets for utilities.87 While some programs, such as the DOE's minimum
energy efficiency standards for appliances, 8 8 are mandatory, many programs
184. CHARLES GOLDMAN ET AL., COORDINATION OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND DEMAND
RESPONSE: A RESOURCE OF THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY ES-i (2010),
available at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/ee-and-dr.pdf.
185. See Inara Scott, "Dancing Backward in High Heels": Examining and Addressing the Disparate
Regulatory Treatment of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Resources, 43 ENVTL. L. 255, 267 (2013).
186. For example, the federal government offered residential customers energy efficiency
tax credits for installing insulation, exterior windows and doors, furnaces, water heaters, and
other appliances. The credit applied to purchases from January 1, 2012, through December
2013. See Residential Energy Efficieny Tax Credit, U.S. DEP'T OFENERGY, http://energy.gov/savings/
residential-energy-efficiency-tax-credit (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). The DOE maintains a
searchable database of state incentives for energy efficiency at www.dsireusa.org.
187. For example, Missouri has a voluntary savings target of 9.9% of electricity demand by
2020. See generally S.B. 376, 9 5th Gen. Assemb., ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009).
188. See Appliance and Equipment Standards Program, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://energy.
gov/eere/buildings/appliance-and-equipment-standards-program (l st visited Jan. 21, 2015).
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remain voluntary, placing them in direct competition with incentive-based
demand response programs.
Customers with some demand flexibility therefore have a choice of
programs. Because a customer that reduces energy usage to participate in
energy efficiency programs can no longer bid that reduction into a demand
response program, they must select one or the other. Rational consumers will
presumably select the most lucrative program.S9 From the customer's
perspective, participation in demand response programs at the wholesale
level can be significantly more lucrative than retail energy efficiency
programs.,90 FERC, therefore, by creating these lucrative wholesale market
programs, is, in the words of their own counsel in recent litigation, "luring"
customers away from retail markets.,9,
Within wholesale markets, incentive-based emand response programs
dominate energy efficiency programs. Some wholesale markets have
experimented with allowing customers to bid energy efficiency commitments
into annual auctions. PJM, for example, allows energy efficiency resources
that can achieve a permanent load reduction to participate in their forward
capacity markets. Qualifying projects include installing energy efficient
lighting and appliances and weatherization projects "that exceed then current
building codes, appliance standards, or relevant state or federal standards."192
These resources may onlyparticipate in the markets for four years, however.,9
In practice and as discussed above, demand response programs provide
more attractive customer opportunities. Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore,
PJM's Reliability Pricing Model ("RPM") capacity auction for delivery years
2014-2015 procured 14,1 18 MW of demand response and only 822 MW of
energy efficiency.'94 The results for the next year's auction saw a 700 MW
increase in demand response resources compared to a mere ioo MW increase
in energy efficiency resources. 195
189. Admittedly, some customers may be motivated by incentives other than price, such as
environmental considerations.
19o . See BETH W. DUNLOP & DONALD GILLIGAN, THE ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND
ENERGY SERVICE COMPANIES IN WHOLESALE MARKETS 5.43 (2000) (stating "it is the price signals
of the wholesale markets, newly opening to demand-side bidding, that provide the potential for
a true market-based opportunity for demand and energy reductions").
ig. Oral Argument at 29:48, Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (No. 11-1486), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings.nsf/
DocsByRDate?OpenView&count= 1oo&SKey=2o 1309.
192. RPM Energy Efficiency (EE) FAQs, PJM.COM, http://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-
ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/rpm-energy-efficiency-faqsashx (last updated Mar. 30, 201 1).
193. Id. In contrast, demand response loads may be bid into capacity markets year afteryear.
194. Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Continue to Grow in PJM's RPM Auction, PR
NEWSWIRE (May 13, 201 1), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/demand-resources-and-
energy-efficiency-continue-to-grow-in-pjms-rpm-auction- 1218o6178.html.
195. PJM, 2015/2016 RPM BASE RESIDUALAUcTION RESULTS 17 (2012), available athttp://
www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/20120518-2o15-1 6-base-residual-
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b. Environmental Trade-Offs
One significant problem with incentivizing temporary over permanent
demand reductions is the minimization of environmental co-benefits.,96 The
environmental benefits of reducing net demand for energy are considerable.
As now-FERC commissioner James Moeller noted in 1993, reducing demand
"does not contribute to acid rain, global warming or stratospheric ozone
depletion. Unlike new nuclear power plants, using [demand-side
management] does not produce radioactive waste.",97 However, demand
response, even TOU and CPP programs, do not necessarily reduce net
demand for energy so much as shift demand from one period to another.,s
8
As discussed in Part I, there are three primary methods of reducing electricity
use to participate in demand response programs: "foregoing," "shifting," and
"onsite generation."'99 If customers forgo energy use entirely, the
environmental impact is net positive. If customers shift energy usage,
however, by altering production times or by using stored energy, the effects
are less clear. And customers who substitute on-site generation may actually
be increasing emissions of some pollutants over the levels that would have
occurred absent their participation in the demand response program.
The benefits of shifting behavior depend on the power supply mix in a
given market. Eliminating or delaying the need to build new generation to
provide power at times of peak demand is not necessarily a net gain from an
emissions perspective if it means that emissions from dirtier baseload plants
increase. If customers shift energy-intensive activities to times of lower
demand to comply with obligations under demand response programs, while
less power is being consumed at peak times, more is being consumed at off-
peak times.oo The plants typically used to supply power at times of peak
demand are newer, relatively cleaner natural gas plants or clean wind energy,
whereas much of the baseload power production in this country is still
auction-report.ashx. While the 2016-2o17 BRA results saw a drop in demand response resources,
this drop can be attributed to changes in the way demand response capacity is calculated in PJM.
196. Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 7, at 1539-41. Vandenbergh and Rossi advocate for
a reduction in the total demand for energy and criticize what they see as the federal government's
"emphasis on reducing peak consumption as its primary demand response goal." Id. at 1543.
197. James W. Moeller, Electric Demand-Side Management Under Federal Law, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
57, 58 (1993).
198. Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 7, at 1532-33 ("DSM efforts have focused on shifting
the timing of demand, not on reducing the total amount of demand.").
199. These terms are drawn from the 2oo6 DOE Report. See 2oo6 DOE REPORT, supra note
2, at 20.
200. See id. at 6 n.9 ("[Demand management programs] may also result in increases in
electricity usage during the majority of hours when electricity prices are lower than average.").
These increases might be due to customers shifting energy-intensive activities to off-peak times
or to the use of certain kinds of energy storage systems that use power to create energy reserves
that can then be used during a demand response event.
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provided by dirtier coal plants.20 Shifting load from peak to off-peak times
may therefore increase the operating levels of coal plants while reducing the
operating levels of natural gas plants and some wind facilities.202
Another environmental consequence of demand response programs is
related to the fact that a substantial percentage of customers participate not
by reducing their energy consumption but by switching to on-site back-up
generation.203 For some facilities, such as hospitals, schools, and sports arenas,
going without electricity may not be an option. The only way these customers
can participate in demand response programs, therefore, is by ensuring an
adequate back-up supply of energy. Many demand response programs
therefore anticipate or even encourage the use of back-up generation to
achieve compliance.o4
Diesel generators account for much of this back-up generation.05 They
are also one of the dirtier sources of electricity. A 2001 report found that
nitrous oxide ("NO.") emissions from diesel generators in the United States
were equivalent to NO, emissions from all power plants in Pennsylvania, New
York, and NewJersey combined, and that "[these generators] produced...
40% more [carbon dioxide] than . . . all [of the] power plants in New
201. Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 7, at 1 532. Of course, the calculus may shift as coal
plants are retired and are replaced by cleaner natural gas-fired plants. And regions such as the
Pacific Northwest where the baseload power is supplied primarily by clean sources, such as
hydroelectric generation, might actually see environmental improvements from load-shifting.
202. See KAREN PALMER ET AL., RFF REPORT: ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, AND EMISSIONS 186-87 (2002), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-
RPT-elecrestruct.pdf (finding an increase in emissions from a real-time pricing scheme but
noting that, for one pollutant, NOx, the environmental consequences of emissions at night might
be less severe than for those during the day); see also 2006 DOE REPORT, supra note 2, at 29
("Emission reductions during peak periods need to be balanced against possible increases in
emissions during off-peak hours as well as from increased use of onsite generation."). The DOE
qualified its environmental predictions in the report by referring to "[p]ossible environmental
benefits." 2006 DOE REPORT, supra note 2, at 29 ("[P]olicymakers should exercise caution in
attributing environmental gains to demand response, because they are dependent on the
emissions profiles and marginal operating costs of the generation plants in specific regions.").
203. At least one study has found that those customers who reduce demand through the use
of on-site generation may be especially likely to participate in demand response programs. See
Nicole Hopper et al., Demand Response from Day-Ahead Hourly Pricing for Large Customers,
ELECTRIcrYJ., Apr. 2006, at 52, 57 (finding, in a study of NYISO's emergency demand response
programs between 2001 and 2004, that there was "a correlation between the presence of onsite
generation and highly responsive customers").
204. Some demand response programs rely specifically on backup generator use. For
example, TECO Power, a Tampa-area utility, has a "standby generator program" that offers
monthly bill credits in exchange for a commitment to switch load from the grid to backup
generation in response to a radio signal from TECO. See Standby Generator Program, TAMPA
ELECTRIC, http://www.tampaelectric.com/business/saveenergy/standbygenerator/ (last visited
Jan. 21, 2015).
205. See Gabriel Nelson,. Air Pollution: Dirty Diesel Generators Test EPA, Demand-Response
Industry, E&E GREENWIRE (July to, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/stories/so59967o47
("[M] any of those [negawatts] come from emergency diesel generators that can release more air
pollution than even the highest-emitting power plants.").
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Jersey.'"2o 6 Customers who use diesel generation to participate in demand
response programs may therefore be increasing net pollution,207 and any
comprehensive assessment of demand response's environmental benefits
must therefore take into account emissions from these diesel engines.
Some states have adopted stringent rules for diesel back-up generation.
In New York, for instance, the Department of Environmental Conservation
tightened requirements on emergency generators in 2009.2.8 It set limits on
annual operating hours as well as caps on the number of working generators
in the New York City area.2 0 9 And in California, the Air Quality Management
District for the Los Angeles area allows backup generators powered by natural
gas, but not diesel, to operate during ISO emergency events for up to a 200
hour-per-year maximum .2..
In a recent rule, the EPA issued hazardous air pollutant standards and
new source performance standards for a particular kind of backup generator
that can be used to participate in demand response programs: Stationary
Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines (colloquially known as
"RICE").21 The new standards make it easier for customers to use RICE to
2o6. VIRINDER SINGH, RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, BLENDING WIND AND SOLAR INTO
THE DIESEL GENERATOR MARKET 6 (2001). The report also noted that diesel generators emit
particulate matter and that diesel oil spills can cause water pollution. Id. at 3. Over a three month
period, for example, diesel generators in remote villages in Alaska resulted in monthly spills of
between loo and 3000 gallons of diesel fuel. Id. at 7.
207. See Paul J. Hibbard et al., Demand Response in Capacity Markets: Reliability, Dispatch and
Emission Outcomes, ELECTRICITYJ., Nov. 2012, at 14, 16 (noting that, in most advanced organized
wholesale markets, "generation-backed DR .. . leads to significantly higher levels of system
emissions on an annual basis, across all pollutants"). The authors conducted a simulation
integrating demand response resources into capacity planning in PJM over ten years and found
that replacing demand resources with natural gas and wind resources (two-thirds and one-third,
respectively, based on actual resources that would be available to PJM) would reduce emissions,
even assuming that only 10-50% of demand response is backed by diesel generation, and even
assuming that this generation would rarely run. Id. at 21. Notably, the authors' overall conclusions
held even when wind resources were removed from the mix. Id. at 22.
2o8. For a description of the permitting process for on-site generation in New York, including
air quality requirements, see generally THOMAS BOURGEOIS ET AL., CLEAN DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
IN NEW YORK STATE: STATE AND LOCAL SITING, PERMITTING AND CODE ISSUES (2003), available at
http://energy.pace.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PaceCHP-Siting-Guidebook.pdf.
209. Hopper et al., supra note 1 15, at 75 (noting that limits are "[d]esigned to achieve
compliance with ozone requirements in severe non-attainment areas throughout New York
State").
210. Fact Sheet on Emergency Backup Generators, S. COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DISTRICT,
http://vww.aqmd.gov/home/permits/emergency-generators (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
Permits that allow generators to run for more than 2o0 hours per year may be obtained if certain
air quality requirements are met. Id.
211. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating Internal
Combustion Engines; New Source Performance Standards for Stationary Internal Combustion
Engines, 78 Fed. Reg. 6674 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 6o, 63) [hereinafter
RICE Rules]. As background, the EPA issues emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants for
stationary sources (as opposed to mobile sources like cars and trucks) by source category. Clean
Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-2o6, § 112, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.
[Vol. loo:885
BYPASSING FEDERALISM
participate in emergency demand response programs by allowing these
engines to run up to 1 oo hours per year without triggering emissions limits.21 
2
This allowance, the EPA said, "ensures that a sufficient number of hours are
available for engines to meet [RTO] and [ISO] tariffs and other requirements
for participating in various emergency demand response programs."2 s The
EPA rejected proposals to require pollution control for diesel generators,
citing concerns that this could make it "economically infeasible" for
customers to participate in demand response programs.1 4
In defense of its standards, the EPA cited the benefits of demand
response programs, including grid stabilization, blackout prevention, and
reliability support.215 It also cited, with approval, comments suggesting that
"the public health impacts [of] power outage[s] outweigh the air quality
impacts from [RICE] .26 The EPA also attempted to minimize the harmful
effects of RICE emissions by relying on information provided by commenters
claiming "that these emergency demand response events are rarely called.""217
The new standards have been attacked as insufficiently protective of the
environment, with some alleging that the EPA took too narrow a view of the
trade-offs involved. As the Independent Market Monitor for PJM commented
in the rulemaking proceeding, "[a] llowing additional run time ... for [RICE]
(2012)). The standards set technology-based requirements (called Maximum Achievable Control
Technology, or "MACT") that sources must achieve. States share responsibility for implementing
and enforcing the program, but MACT standards are set at the federal level. EPA also issues
emissions performance standards for new and modified stationary source categories under the
NSPS program for a shorter list of pollutants, although there is some overlap. Clean Air Act § 1 1 1.
212. See 4o C.F.R. § 63 .664 o (f) (ii) (permitting RICE owners or operators to run their RICE
up to too hours annually).
213. RICE Rules, supra note 21 1, at 6675. It was already permissible to run RICE for too
hours per year but only "for maintenance and testing." Id. Programs such as PJM's Emergency
Load Response Program, for example, require resources to be available for 6o hours per year of
curtailment. Id. at 6679. The same hour limitations were applied to RICE under the new national
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants ("NESHAPS"). Id. at 668o. For larger engines
contracted for at least 1 5 hours per year of demand response program participation, the EPA
established ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel and reporting requirements. Id. at 668o. While low-sulfur
fuel may mitigate some of the environmental impacts of these larger engines, concerns about
other pollutants, such as carbon and volatile organics, remain. See id. at 6676 ("The estimated
reductions in 2013 found that 201o RICE NESHAP rulemaking with these final amendments
are... 36,ooo tpy of carbon monoxide ... and 36,000 tpy of volatile organic compounds."). In
addition, commenters noted that emergency events are often called on ozone exceedance days,
and thus, that emissions contributing to ozone formation were of particular concern. Id. at 6685.
214. Id. at 6679.
215. Id. at 6675, 6679. Environmental benefits were conspicuously absent from this list.
FERC, too, has made special allowances for on-site generators that permit uncontrolled
emissions. For example, following the California energy crisis, FERC invoked a "good cause"
exception to permit owners of back-up generation to sell their power at wholesale without
meeting the requirements of section 205 of the FPA. Removing Obstacles, supra note 15o, at
15,861.
2 16. RICE Rules, supra note 211, at 6685.
217. Id. at 6679.
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generators would permit RICE generators to displace conservation-based
demand side resources."2,s This, in turn, will limit the air quality benefits of
demand response.
2
.9
The RICE rules have already been challenged by Delaware's Department
of Natural Resources and Environmental Control and the Conservation Law
Foundation ("CLF"), as well as traditional generators, such as PSEG, Calpine,
and FirstEnergy.o The CLF claimed that allowing "dirty diesel" to participate
in demand response programs does not, in fact, reduce demand and risks
more air pollution.2 , Similarly, the director of the Division of Air Quality for
the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control
argued that "The rule as written promotes extended use of diesel generators,
which were not intended to be used as power plants... [this] has the potential
to result in a tremendous amount of air pollution during the worst times of
the year when we're trying to combat ozone."22
Thus, despite the EPA's efforts, the use of backup generation continues
to raise questions about the environmental benefits of demand response
programs. Even so, the EPA rules are a good example of the kind of federal
standardization and streamlining that is needed within demand response
programs. The rules also provide some advantages over patchwork state
218. JEFFREY M. MAYES, MONITORING ANALYrICs, LLC, COMMENTS OF THE INDEPENDENT
MARKET MONITOR FOR PJM 1 (2013).
219. It is also of concern that the EPA failed to work with FERC to pursue a coordinated
federal policy in the final rule. The EPA unhelpfully recommended that commenters who were
concerned about the possible interaction between FERC's new compensation rules for demand
response, which were aimed at increasing participation in demand response programs, and the
new RICE rule take the matter up with FERC. RICE Rules, 6674 Fed. Reg. at 6685 (noting that
air quality and health concerns resulting from interplay between the two rules were "more
appropriately directed towards the FERC"); see also Memorandum from Vickie Patton et al., Envtl.
Def. Fund, to Air & Radiation Docket & Info. Ctr., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Dec. 3, 2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/oira_2o6o/ 2 6oo 103
2013-1 .pdf (arguing that FERC's new compensation rule would increase participation in demand
response programs, including participation by resources relying on backup generation, and that
EPA should take this increase into account).
220. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating
Internal Combustion Engines; New Source Performance Standards for Stationary Internal
Combustion Engines, 78 Fed. Reg. 54,6o6,54,6o6-07 (Sept. 5, 2013) (to be codified at o C.F.R.
pts. 6o, 63); John Funk, FirstEnergy Halts Its Challenge to Efficiency Mandates, for Now,
CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 28, 2012, 9:48 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/
2012/1i/firstenergy-halts-its-challeng.html (stating that the company abandoned its
challenge, "but would not rule out a future attempt"). The EPA made no changes to the rule in
response to these petitions. NESHAP for Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines; NSPS for
Stationary Internal Combustion Engines, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,072, 48,072 (Aug. 15, 2014) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 6o, 63).
221. EPA Draws Competing Lawsuits overDiesel GeneratorAir Rule, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Apr.
4,2013.
222. Jessica Coomes, EPA Faces Lawsuits over Rule Allowing Longer Operation of Backup
Generators, BNA DAILY ENVT REP., Apr. 3, 2013, at A-6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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regulation in that they create uniformity and predictability for demand
response program participants.223
But unless the EPA promulgates more stringent regulations for backup
generators, or FERC limits the use of backup generators for demand response
customers in wholesale markets, FERC's bypassing strategy will continue to
crowd out more environmentally beneficial strategies for controlling
consumer demand for electricity.
B. FlEDERALISM CONCERNS
Bypassing may also circumvent important procedural safeguards
associated with the traditional legislative processes. When the Constitution
was adopted, one of the key compromises made by advocates of a stronger
national government was that the new federal system would adequately
preserve state power and state interests. Congress was granted only specifically
enumerated powers in Article I, while the states and the people retained all
powers not otherwise specified.224 Recognizing this initial allocation and the
importance of the issue, the courts have imposed certain safeguards on
adjustments to federalism boundaries. Perhaps most notably, federalism
concerns animate the presumption against preemption applied by courts in
interpreting legislative and regulatory pronouncements that conflict with
state law.225
While the basic principles of federalism are still taken seriously, the years
since the founding of this nation have seen a one-way ratchet of power in favor
of the federal government.226 Judicial protections are now more rhetorical
than actual. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked the
223. Hopper et al., supra note 115, at 72 (citing a third-party aggregator as saying that
investments in generators were too risky "without clear, long-term rules" on generator
participation in demand response programs).
224. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). The nature of the balance struck-what falls within the federal sphere and what falls
within the state sphere-is less important here than that the drawing of a boundary was of
fundamental importance to the Framers.
225. See, e.g., Medtronic v. Lohr, Inc., 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("[B]ecause the States are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action."); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
518 (1992) (construing provisions of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act "in light
of the presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations"); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 2t8, 230 (1947) ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.");.
226. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NoTR. DAME
L. REv. 167, 167 (1996) (remarking that, during the New Deal, the Commerce Clause "expanded
the powers of the federal government far beyond any level that it had previously held"). In 1954,
Herbert Wechsler remarked on this "centralizing growth," although he concluded that "federal
law is still a largely interstitial product, rarely occupying any field completely." Wechsler, supra
note 161, at 544-45.
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phrase "Our Federalism," which stands for "a system in which ... the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights
and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."' 27 However, the Court
takes pains to emphasize that "Our Federalism" is a two-edged sword. Our
system protects state interests, but it also vindicates the principle of national
control where necessary. 2s The presumption against preemption, too, has
seen better days and is no longer invoked enthusiastically by the courts.2 9
Notwithstanding this general trend, the rise of the administrative state
has created additional procedural concerns about shifting power dynamics.2so
As Catherine Sharkey has noted, with the growing importance of agency
interpretations of federal law has come "the ascendancy of federal agencies in
preemption disputes."31 Even outside the preemption context, states are
increasingly being forced to fight jurisdictional battles at the agency level.
While no federal lawsuit materialized in response to FERC's Order 719,32
state interests voiced their opposition to the move in regulatory proceedings.
For example, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
("NARUC"), which represents tate regulators, pushed hard to obtain an "opt-
in" in the final rule that would not allow retail demand response customers to
participate in wholesale demand response programs unless the relevant state
or local regulator affirmatively allowed them to do so.3s
As agencies assume greater responsibility for interpreting and
implementing federal statutes, it is only natural that questions arise about
whether unelected actors should adjust the boundaries between state and
227. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971). The phrase has been used in no fewer than
87 decisions. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) ("[Olur federalism requires that
Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns andjoint
participants in the governance of the Nation.").
228. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (noting that "[t]he concept does not mean blind deference to
'States' Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our
National Government and its courts").
229. See MaryJ. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967,
968 (2002).
230. Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 524 (2012).
231. Id. Of particular concern has been the practice of "preemption by preamble," in which
agencies introduce their preemptive intent not in the regulatory text proper, but in the printed
preamble to those regulations that appear in the Federal Register. Regulatory preambles are
required by 1 C.F.R. § 18.12 and are intended to provide a lay reader with an understanding of
the basis and purpose for the rule. For a thorough discussion of this practice, see Catherine M.
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
227 (2007) (describing the increasing prevalence of preemptive intent in regulatory preambles).
232. The Order permits retail customers to bid demand response loads into federal markets.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text. Some states did, however, challenge the Order's
implementation by RTOs and ISOs. See, e.g., Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm'n v. FERC, 668 F.3d
735, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (challenging PJM's tariff revisions in response to the Order).
233. See Order 719, supra note 145, at 74-75. FERC instead adopted an "opt-out," which
allowed participation unless state and local regulators affirmatively disallowed it. Id. at 83-84.
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federal authority. Some checks certainly exist. It has been argued, for
example, that the nondelegation doctrine234 safeguards federalism by
preventing agencies from circumventing a process (legislation) carefully
calibrated to preserve state interests.s5 Courts have also been less than
completely deferential to agency preemption decisions: while the Supreme
Court has given "some weight" to an agency's analysis of whether state tort law
conflicts with federal purposes,2s6 it has declined to defer to the agency's
conclusion that state law has been preempted.2s7
Like broad legislative delegations and agency preemption, bypassing
might be seen as a member of a set of suspect procedural innovations
designed to circumvent the twin requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. As Bradford Clark has noted, when federal actors avoid the
legislative process, they may "exercise more power than the Constitution
contemplates, at the expense of state authority."ss They do so by avoiding
structural and political checks that ensure that state interests are represented
in any effort to increase the sphere of federal authority.239 State interests
might be better safeguarded through the traditional legislative process than
in an administrative rulemaking for several reasons. First, the states play a
substantial role in selecting members of Congress.4- Thus, those members
might be expected to better represent state interests than administrators who
owe no allegiance to the states. More crucially, all laws must be passed by the
234. The nondelegation doctrine prevents Congress from delegating power to
administrative agencies absent an "intelligible principle" to govern its application. See J.W.
Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall lay down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
235. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1321,
1374 (2oo1).
236. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576-77 (2009) (applying Skidmore deference,
which accords weight to an agency's interpretation based on the "thoroughness, consistency and
persuasiveness" of the agency's analysis).
237. Nina Mendelson has suggested that a "presumption against agency preemption" is
needed. Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 695,699
(2oo8) (emphasis omitted). She argues that agencies are poorly situated to make federalism
decisions because of their institutional focus and their "stake in validating their own policy
decisions." Id.
238. Clark, supra note 235, at 1324.
239. See id. at 13 7 2; Wechsler, supra note 161, at 544-45.
240. See Wechsler, supra note 161, at 544, 546-48. Although the influence of states in the
selection process i somewhat diluted now that Senators are popularly elected and political parties
play a greater role in selecting candidates, Representatives are still elected by state voters. Id. at
546-47. Of course, the story about influence is not one-sided. Representatives, once elected, may
feel more ties to federal policy as part of the national government, and, to the extent that
legislators are affected more by special interest groups than by individual voters, those interest
groups might have national as well as state and local interests. Nevertheless, the basic point is a
comparative one: members of Congress are more aware of and tied to the interests of states than
are federal administrators.
2015]
IOWA LA W REVIEW
Senate, an institution created in part to ensure that the interests of all states,
even the less populous ones, would be represented at the federal level.
One might also think that the relatively deliberate pace of the legislative
process might produce better considered reallocations of power than would
adjustments by administrative agencies.241 Barring situations in which one
party controls both the House and the Senate (and times of extraordinary
national consensus, for example in the wake of a highly publicized crisis),
legislation is typically a drawn-out process. More deliberate decision-making
can ensure that more voices are heard, including state voices, at the policy
formulation stage.
A related concern is that administrative federalism adjustments are better
shielded from view and therefore less likely to have the benefit of stakeholder
debate than legislative proposals. This concern might be muted in the case of
notice and comment rulemaking, where all interested parties may file
comments on proposed rules (to which the agency must respond).242 In the
case of bypassing, however, where the change works an incidental, rather than
an explicit alteration of authority, there is still cause for concern. This is
because affected states and localities must recognize the magnitude of the
threat in time to raise the issue before the agency.
One response to concerns about bypassing is simply that the growth of
the administrative state, coupled with the relative intransigence of Congress,
makes such innovations unavoidable. But even if this is so, modifications of
constitutional procedures can be countered with other modifications that put
the system back into balance.243 The best solution might therefore be to add
procedural safeguards back into the system, albeit at different points.
The first possibility is to set the courts up as guardians of federalism. Even
in cases where no state law would be rendered inoperable, the Court has
recognized the limits of administrative authority to broaden federal power. In
Solid Waste Agency of North Cook County, for example, a case in which the Court
invalidated the Army Corps of Engineers' assertion of federaljurisdiction over
certain intrastate waters under the Clean Water Act, the majority opinion
noted that "Congress [also] does not casually authorize administrative
agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional authority
241. See Clark, supranote 235, at 1325 (noting that the cumbersome process of bicameralism
and presentment means that a small number of proposed bills becomes law in any given year).
242. Mendelson, supra note 237, at 717 (citing testimony from Senator Patrick Leahy,
remarking that comments made through the notice-and-comment process are less visible than
objections raised by members of Congress).
243. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (arguing that the administrative state itself
requires a rebalancing of the initial allocation of power between the three primary branches of
government to prevent encroachment); Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Separation of Powers as a
Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. i6oi (2008) (arguing that given the departure
from the original constitutional structure represented by the administrative state, other, even
constitutionally suspect, safeguards, such as the legislative veto, might be introduced).
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[especially] where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state
framework."44
A strong state-centric approach to judicial interpretation would read
congressional authorizations narrowly where federalism concerns are
implicated and would therefore brand most bypassing attempts ultra vires.
Congress, it might be argued, knows how to authorize federal agencies to step
in where states fail to address a problem adequately. In the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, for example, Congress authorized construction of federal siting of
transmission lines in certain areas of the country if state and local authorities
failed to act.2 45 Similarly, the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to draft federal
air quality plans for states that are unwilling or unable to draft adequate plans
themselves.246 According to this argument, congressional silence should
therefore not be interpreted as authorizing bypassing.247
Another possibility is to rehabilitate what Herbert Wechsler called "a
burden of persuasion on those favoring national intervention."248 While
Wechsler was referring to the legislative process, one could envision a similar
burden on administrative agencies seeking to enlarge the scope of federal
responsibility. In essence, the agency would have to persuade a court that
federalization, even de facto federalization, was superior to state-by-state
governance in order for its reading of a statute as authorizing greater federal
control to be found reasonable.249 This approach would recognize the
federalism concerns bypassing prompts but would find ways to address those
concerns short of disfavoring bypassing in every instance.
One major drawback of both of these approaches is the problem that
made bypassing attempts appealing in the first place: congressional
intransigence. Congressional delegations to agencies are capacious, in part,
because agencies have the agility and energy to adapt to changing
circumstances. If we wait for Congress to update statutory provisions, many
statutory anachronisms will remain unaddressed. Thus the problem pits the
interests of states in a process that protects their interests against the
desirability of nimble policy adjustment in response to a swiftly changing
economy.
244. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73
(2001).
245. 16 U.S.C. § 82 4p(b) (2012).
246. 4 2 U.S.C. § 7 410(c)(1) (2012).
247. Nina Mendelson makes a version of this argument in her article on agency preemption,
arguing that agencies should be required to point to clear evidence of Congressional intent
before preempting state law. Mendelson, supra note 237, at 707-08.
248. Wechsler, supra note 161, at 545.
249. Under the familiar two-part test articulated in the Chevron case, a court will defer to an
agency's reading of a statutory provision it is authorized to administer if, first, the statutory
provision is ambiguous, and, second, the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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Of course, concerns about eclipsing state authority are more muted
outside of the preemption context. Bypassing threatens only prospective
lawmaking, rather than invalidating existing acts of state legislatures and state
courts. Concerns are further minimized when the federal government has a
reasonable argument that it is acting within the scope of its existing authority,
and that any effects on state power are therefore incidental.
Ultimately, the ability of courts to mitigate the bypassing problem is
probably limited. An approach that relies on the courts to distinguish cases in
which agency action works a de facto diminution of state authority is unlikely
to be judicially administrable. The Supreme Court has already made clear that
it believes there is no meaningful distinction between 'jurisdictional" and
"nonjurisdictional" statutory provisions for purposes of applying the Chevron
doctrine.5o Thus, the Court held that Chevron deference was due to agency
interpretations of statutes they administer notwithstanding anyjurisdictional
implications.5 Thus, even if there is a danger that bypassing might encroach
on state power, and even if that encroachment is seen as undesirable as a
matter of policy or even contrary to the intentions of the Framers, there may
be little courts can do to limit its occurrence short of some type of judicial
nullification strategy.15
2
The best option, therefore, might be to enhance procedural safeguards
at the agency level, as suggested by Catherine Sharkey in the context of agency
preemption. Sharkey finds that agency preemption of state law is here to stay
but that agencies offer certain advantages over Congress as "loci of
meaningful debate with state government entities about the impact of federal
regulatory schemes on state regulatory interests."53 Where agencies choose
to bypass jurisdictional allocations of authority, certain procedural
interventions might lessen the legislative process's superiority in safeguarding
state interests.
Some of the mechanisms that Sharkey suggests for disciplining
preemption by preamble would also help mute the concerns related to
bypassing strategies. An additional benefit of these suggestions i that they
could be implemented by the executive acting alone, rather than requiring
new legislation. One way to limit administrative discretion in areas where state
authority might be affected is through executive order. President Clinton did
exactly that when he signed Executive Order ("E.O.") 13,132 in 1999 which
remains good law. It states that agencies should be guided by a series of
250. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868-69 (2013).
251. In fact, in City ofArlington, the relevant provision concerned the line between the FCC's
authority and that of state regulators. Id.
252. Injudicial nullification, as injury nullification, a court reaches an outcome they believe
to be contrary to law either because the court disagrees with the law to be applied or believes the
law should not apply in that particular case.
253. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 DUKE L.J.
2125, 2129 (2009).
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federalism principles "[i] n formulating and implementing policies that have
federalism implications."254 One such principle that could apply to bypassing
is that "[t] he national government should be deferential to the States when
taking action that affects the policymaking discretion of the States and should
act only with the greatest caution where State or local governments have
identified uncertainties regarding the constitutional or statutory authority of
the national government."55 "Uncertainties" regarding the federal
government's authority to allow retail customers to participate in wholesale
demand response programs have certainly been identified, for example.256
The E.O. also states that, "[t]o the extent practicable, state and local
officials shall be consulted" before any action "that would limit the
policymaking discretion of the states" is implemented.57 This language is
broad enough that it should apply to bypassing strategies as well as to actions
that directly preempt state authority. Even de facto reallocations of power
from the state to the federal government might limit a state's "policymaking
discretion" if it makes certain policies less effective or limits the states'
discretion to block other policies.
The E.O. further states that, where "significant uncertainties" exist as to
whether a proposed action is authorized by law or is "appropriate," agencies
should explore other means of attaining their objectives by consulting with
state and local officials.25S More directly, the E.O. states that agencies
formulating or implementing policies with federalism implications "shall,..
encourage States to develop their own policies to achieve program objectives
and to work with appropriate officials in other states."259 If FERC had followed
this guidance in the context of demand-side reductions, it might have made
more transparent attempts to encourage state demand response and energy
efficiency programs before making wholesale market participation available
to retail customers.
The E.O. contains separate, more stringent requirements for agency
actions that preempt state law, including consultation with affected actors,
publication of a federalism impact statement in the federal register, and
disclosure of communications between the agency and state or local officials
to the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") 60 These requirements
254. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999).
255. Id. at 43,256.
256. See Brief for Petitioners, Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 753 F.3 d 216 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (No. 11-1486).
257. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,256.
258. Id.
259. Id.
26o. Sharkey has suggested that these requirements are a good start but must be
implemented more consistently by agencies. Sharkey, supra note 23o, at 526-27. She has
proposed that agencies enact internal guidelines to ensure compliance with the E.O., that state
consultation be enhanced, and that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA")
in OMB take a more active role in guiding and overseeing these procedures. Id. at 572-73. Nina
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could be extended to actions that will have a significant effect on state
authority, regardless of whether any laws are actually preempted. Although
this step would come with regulatory costs, the benefits of advance
consultation could far outweigh them if, for example, consultation prevented
expensive lawsuits.
One issue is that the executive cannot bind independent agencies such
as FERC through executive order. E.O. 13,132 expressly excludes
independent regulatory agencies from its requirements.26, It has been argued,
however, that the executive-independent agency dichotomy is not meaningful
and that presidents should therefore be able to issue binding directives to any
agency unless Congress has plainly forbidden it.2 62 Even if the federalism
provisions are not binding, however, the president could request that
independent agencies comply with them, either by revising the text of E.O.
13,132, by issuing a companion order, or through other channels.263
The combination of aging statutes and new exigencies, as we see in the
regulation of executive demand, likely means that agency bypassing as a
strategy is here to stay. That administrative agencies exploiting their own
sphere of influence will encroach on traditional state powers is a genuine
concern. However, for the reasons articulated above, a judicial solution is
unlikely. Implementing additional procedural safeguards at the agency level
is a more promising way to address state concerns over jurisdictional
encroachments. This "rebalanced" system might bypass the safeguards that
the Framers put in place to protect state interests, but it replaces them with
procedures that achieve the same purposes.
C. THE COSTS OF BYPASSING
While bypassing avoids the costs of challenging legislative boundaries
directly, an agency's creative interpretation of statutory federalism provisions
is still likely to be disputed. This is particularly true if the agency elects an
aggressive posture that threatens state interests. The success of a bypassing
strategy may thus depend on an agency's willingness to exercise restraint in
its implementation.
Mendelson has also found that agencies' record in preparing "federalism impact analyses" under
E.O. 13132 is "quite poor." Mendelson, supranote 237, at 718-19.
261. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,255 (excluding independent regulatory
agencies from the Order's scope).
262. See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, DeconstructinglndependentAgencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 824-43 (2013).
263. There is precedent for this approach. Cary Coglianese notes that President Obama has
at times been particularly pointed in his language, noting that independent agencies "should"
comply with various directives rather than merely requesting that they do so. See, e.g., Exec. Order
No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 2os 1) (noting that independent regulatory agencies
"should" comply with E.O. 13,563, which contained several measures aimed at improving the
regulatory process).
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While many petitioners asked FERC to reconsider its first effort in Order
719 to open wholesale markets to retail demand response resources, the
Order largely escaped judicial challenge. FERC's jurisdictional authority was
questioned in Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission v. FERC, in which Indiana
regulators challenged FERC's approval of PJM's tariff provisions
implementing Order 719, but the D.C. Circuit held in that case that the
plaintiffs had not adequately preserved their jurisdictional arguments.64
The reason for dissenting states' and other interest parties' failure to
challenge Order 719 more aggressively is clear. As explained above, Order
719 provided states with an "opt-out": the relevant state retail regulatory
authority could prohibit retail customers' participation in wholesale
markets.265 Thus, the stakes were likely not sufficiently high to make an
expensive legal battle worthwhile. Order 745 changed that calculus by making
retail customer participation in wholesale "economic" demand response
programs (programs in which customers bid their services in response to high
prices as opposed to emergency, capacity or ancillary services programs)
much more lucrative.266 The facial challenge to Order 745's pricing scheme
and collateral attack on FERC's jurisdictional authority to set such prices in
the first instance followed.
Last May, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit agreed with the petitioners
and invalidated Order 745, finding both that its compensation scheme was
arbitrary and capricious and, more importantly, that FERC lackedjurisdiction
to promulgate the compensation scheme in the first instance.267 The
jurisdictional ruling was the more problematic and far-reaching of the two,
and the compensation holding, described as an alternative justification for
invalidating the rule, was discussed without much fanfare or analysis in the
final two pages of the opinion. The twojudge majority found that FERC could
not assign wholesale rates for demand response provided by retail customers
because doing so impermissibly encroached on state jurisdiction to set retail
rates.68 In his thorough and carefully-reasoned dissent, Judge Harry Edwards
concluded that Order 745 was "hardly the stuff of grand agency overreach"
and should be upheld.269 He explained that setting prices for demand
response in the wholesale markets, which are clearly under FERC's
jurisdiction, in no way constituted direct regulation of retail rates, and
therefore failed to encroach on the domain carved out for states in the FPA.7
°
264. Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm'n v. FERC, 668 F.3d 735, 739, 739-40 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(finding that the petitioners'jurisdictional arguments had not been "set forth clearly" before the
agency as required by statute).
265. SeeOrder 719, supranote 145.
266. Order 745, supra note 145, at 74.
267. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 753 F-3d 2 16, 222-25 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
268. Id. at 218, 222.
269. Id. at 233 (Edwards,J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 233-34.
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Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the litigation, the lesson for
agencies engaged in bypassing strategies may be that discretion is the better
part of valor. Two features of an agency's bypassing strategy affect the
likelihood of challenge. First, the closer an agency gets to the statutory
jurisdictional boundary, the more likely it is to face opposition. More
controversial policies are also likely to produce costly challenges. Certain
bypassing policies, such as the federal government's decision to proceed with
hydraulic fracturing rulemaking for federal lands described below, might be
controversial but are squarely within the government's existing authority.
FERC's mistake was to elect a contentious pricing mechanism in a
jurisdictional space that lay close to the limits of its authority. While the D.C.
Circuit panel's resolution of the jurisdictional question may yet be overturned
or at least limited, FERC's failure to proceed with caution may prove to be the
undoing of its policies in this area.7'
D. POSTPONING LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Paradoxically, although bypassing may be less desirable than legislation
for the reasons outlined above, the strategy might actually make an ultimate
legislative solution less likely. This is because, by making the existing
jurisdictional framework appear more workable, bypassing can mask the
existence of disconnects between statutory jurisdictional allocations and
modern exigencies.
Although a comprehensive legislative reassessment of the jurisdictional
boundaries in the FPA is unlikely, Congress could take a more active role in
shaping incentive programs for demand-side management. Were it to do so,
it could promote energy efficiency programs alongside peak demand
reduction to achieve both greater conservation and environmental benefits.
However, because FERC's strategy allows it to report progress on demand-side
management generally, the approach may be muting signals to Congress that
legislative intervention is needed.272
Federalism has become one of the key stumbling blocks to rolling out
demand-side programs nationwide.273 Indeed, the federalism boundaries
271. For more extended discussion of the benefits of agency restraint, see Sharon Jacobs,
The Administrative State's Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565 (2014).
272. Ironically, a failed bypassing attempt may actually generate increased congressional
attention. A senate bill introduced after the D.C. Circuit's ruling would have given FERC explicit
authority to regulate demand response. S. 2947, 113 th Cong. (2014).
273. For recent literature addressing this problem, see, for example, Ann E. Carlson, Energy
Efficiency and Federalism, 1 SAN DIEGOJ. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 11 (2009) (describing the federal
roadblocks states have faced in promoting energy efficiency); Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards
for Nationwide Products Revisited: Federalism, Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards,
34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 335 (2010) (discussing the interplay between federal appliance
efficiency standards and state efforts). Federalism limitations have also caused problems for states
and the federal government in pursuing sustainable energy initiatives more broadly. See, e.g.,
Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States'Rights: Discerning the Energy Future
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drawn in 1935 in the FPA may no longer be appropriate in today's world. The
electricity industry has changed in fundamental ways since 1935, and
technology has advanced to permit practices never contemplated by the
drafters of the FPA. To name just a few innovations, power plants have
become much larger (only two power plants larger than 5oo MW existed in
the U.S. prior to 1948, compared with 122 by 1972);274 the energy grid is
increasingly interconnected thanks to the development of higher voltage
transmission lines;275 wholesale markets have grown in size and
prominence;76 and many states have restructured their vertically-integrated
monopolistic market structure to allow competition.277
The Commerce Clause provides ample room for expansion of the federal
role. As the Supreme Court has written, "it is difficult to conceive of a more
basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy," since it is "a
product used in virtually every home and every commercial or manufacturing
facility" and "[n]o State relies solely on its own resources in this respect."271
Thus there is little doubt that Congress could enact legislation that would
situate primary responsibility for regulating retail electricity rates and services
in a federal agency.
There is precedent for more aggressive assertion ofjurisdiction in some
areas of energy law. Although states are generally responsible for the siting of
generation, for example, the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("NRC") has exclusive jurisdiction over the siting and safety regulation of
nuclear power plants,279 and FERC has similar responsibility for licensing
hydroelectric facilities.28° Congress has also taken tentative steps in the
Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507 (2004) (arguing that
several state renewable energy programs violate the dormant commerce clause).
274. MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO, NAT'L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY,
ELECTRICrIY TRANSMISSION: A PRIMER 4 (2004), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/primer.pdf.
275. Id. at 4 (noting that high-voltage transmission lines were rare in the 195os but tripled
in the 196os). Today, there are more than 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines in the
United States. See Transmission, supra note 42.
276. See ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 19 (2007) ("When the
FPA was enacted, wholesale and interstate sales of electricity were limited."). Between the 1970s
and 2004, electric utilities' ownership of electric generation dropped from 95% of all generation
to less than 6o%. Id. at to.
277. As of September 2010, 16 states and the District of Columbia had moved from
monopolistic to competitive electricity market structures. Seven states had begun the
restructuring process but suspended it following the California energy crisis. Status of Electricity
Restructuring by State, supra note 34.
278. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
279. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2011 etseq. (2012)).
28o. 16 U.S.C. § 791 (repealed 1935). FERC also has plenary authority to authorize the
siting and construction of onshore or near-shore liquid natural gas ("LNG") import or export
facilities. Natural GasAct § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7 17b(1) (2012).
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direction of federalizing power over new transmission siting to facilitate the
development of renewable energy. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, it
authorized DOE to designate "National Interest Electric Transmission
Corridors" ("NIETC") in areas where transmission suffers from congestion or
capacity constraints.28' In any area so designated, FERC was granted authority
to issue a permit for transmission construction if the state or local authority
proved unable or unwilling to do So.
2
8
2
Yet, despite the growing incongruity between the emergence of
electricity as a national product and the jurisdictional limits of the FPA, and
despite a solid legal basis for expansion of the federal role in regulating
electricity, legislative readjustment of the FPA's federalism boundaries is
unlikely. First, Congress has been virtually deadlocked, and the prospects for
significant legislation of any kind are dim.283 Even consensus measures on
energy efficiency are proving difficult to pass. Last year, bipartisan energy
efficiency legislation that had been stripped down to a handful of
uncontroversial measures was delayed indefinitely by disagreements over
amendments and by the government funding crisis.284 Prospects for the
newest incarnation of the bill are uncertain, even after several new
281. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1221(a), 119 Stat. 594, 946-47
(codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
282. Id. § 1221(b), 119 Stat. at94 7.
283. See Rachel Weiner & Ed O'Keefe, Judging the (Un)productivity of the 1i3th Congress, WASH.
POST (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2o13/o8/02/judging-
the-unproductivity-of-the-s13th-congress/ (noting that the 112th Congress "was the most
unproductive" since measurement began in 1948 and predicting that the 51 3 th would be even
worse based on legislative output in its first six months); see also Amanda Terkel, Ii3th Congress on
Pace to BeL eastProductivein Modern History, HUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2013, 2:22 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2o13/07/o8/13 th-congress-bills-n-3563oo8.html (explaining that the
113 th Congress had passed only 15 bills as ofJuly 2013, eight fewer than what the 12th Congress
had passed at the same point in time, making it the most unproductive Congress since the 1940s).
The government shutdown over Congress's inability to agree on an amendment-free measure to
fund the federal government, even temporarily, is merely the latest manifestation of legislative
gridlock. See, e.g., Roxana Tiron et al., Government Shutdown Begins As Deadlocked Congress Flails,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 1, 2013, 8:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2o 3-1u-u 1/government
-shutdown-begins-as-deadlocked-congress-flails.html.
284. See Ben Geman, Government Funding Battle Knocks Stalled Efficiency Bill off Senate Floor,
HILL (Sept. 19, 2013, 9:57 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/323523-
government-funding-battle-knocks-stalled-efficiency-bill-off-senate-floor. The measure had
stalled before the funding crisis due to disagreements about "non-germane amendments."
Ramsey Cox, Reid Threatens to Pull Energy Efficiency Bill IfAmendment Deal Isn't Reached, HILL (Sept.
18, 2013, 2:44 PM), http://itk.thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/322973-reid-threatens-
to-pull-energy-efficiency-bill-if-amendment-deal-isnt-reached. The bill, co-sponsored by Senators
Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Rob Portman (R-Ohio), would have strengthened national model
building codes and provided incentives for state and federal adoption, encouraged research and
development in energy efficient technologies and created a voluntary program to recognize
supply chain efficiency, and required the federal government to conserve energy in federal
buildings. Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2013, S. 1392, s13th Cong.
(2013)-
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amendments were added as part of a compromise agreement.s5 Second, in
light of this reality, the Obama Administration has put its weight behind
regulatory, as opposed to legislative, solutions to climate and energy
problems.
Third, we are unlikely to see the kind of popular groundswell in favor of
federalized energy law that we saw in the environmental context in the i 96os
and 197os. Richard Lazarus has explained the rise and persistence of the
environmental movement of that era by noting "the depth of the shift in
public attitudes" resulting from a "fundamental reconceptualization of time
and space" that crystallized concerns about human impacts on the
environment.286 Advancing technology allowed for expanded horizons but
also wrought visible changes on the landscape. Visual imagery, such as the
famous photograph of the Earth from space, made life seem fragile.28 7
Manmade disasters, such as the oil slicks that caught fire in the Cuyahoga
River in 1969, made environmental degradation more immediately salient,
while authors and journalists raised the specter of invisible threats from
radiation poisoning to pesticide contamination.
8
Problems in energy law in general, and electricity law in particular, are
unlikely to trigger such widespread reactions. Even disasters like the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2oi o failed to produce a legislative response.
The most immediately salient problems in electricity law, which relate to
reliability and pricing, are even less likely to spur action. The 2003 blackout
in the Northeast did produce mandatory national reliability standards with
hefty civil penalties for non-compliance,8 9 and additional crises might propel
popular support for further federalization. However, in the absence of such
crises, the existing federalism lines are unlikely to be redrawn. In general,
popular groundswells are unlikely in the context of electricity reform because,
like environmental reforms, energy reforms are costly in the present while
their benefits will be felt primarily in the future. Furthermore, energy issues
can be even more complex than their environmental counterparts, making
285. See Nick Juliano, Energy Efficiency: Shaheen, Portman Finalize Latest Version of Their Bill
Ahead of Tomorrow's Release, E&E DAILY (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1o5999
5135/print.
286. RICHARDJ. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 44 (2004). As Lazarus is
careful to explain, movements do not emerge from nowhere, and although the environmental
movement may have "had its first, most formal, expression during" that era, it relied on deep
historical roots in natural resources law as well as health and safety regulation. Id.
287. Id. at 56-57.
288. Id. at 59.
289. See 16 U.S.C. 8240 (2012) (requiring FERC to review and approve mandatory reliability
standards developed by an electric reliability organization). The requirement was adopted in the
Energy Policy Act of 2005. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 1 19 Stat. 594
(codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
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them difficult for the public to grasp.2 90 "Well-balanced supply and demand"
does not make as persuasive a rallying cry as "clean air" or "clean water."
Although redrawing the jurisdictional lines in electricity law might not
be feasible, Congress could still do more to promote demand-side incentives.
For example, it might require FERC to take a more balanced approach to
promoting energy efficiency alongside demand response programs. Congress
could also provide better incentives for state action on energy efficiency
programs in particular, and FERC could do a better job of coordinating and
promoting state efforts. The danger of FERC's bypassing approach is that it
might mute incentives for Congress to take any of these steps.
CONCLUSION
Demand response is a growing phenomenon in the electricity sector.
Demand response resources now total approximately 9.2% of U.S. peak
demand.91 However, the potential remains for even greater demand-side
reductions. To help achieve that potential, FERC has set up demand response
programs in regional wholesale energy markets, essentially "bypassing" some
of the jurisdictional limitations in the FPA. But the "bypassing" strategy, while
creative, has significant downsides. First, FERC's focus on demand response,
the simplest demand-side program to implement in wholesale markets, risks
crowding out more conservation-focused, environmentally-friendly forms of
demand reductions, such as energy efficiency. Second, bypassing raises
federalism concerns that are arguably better addressed through the legislative
process. Third, bypassing, if executed incautiously, may not avoid litigation
costs. Finally, bypassing, by masking any underlying problems in the statute's
federalism allocations, might postpone a legislative fix.
Bypassing has proved a popular strategy for agencies confronting
outdated statutory mandates. Even within electricity law, demand response
programs are merely the latest example of FERC's self-help approach to
jurisdictional boundaries. FERC's efforts to grow wholesale electricity
markets, for example, have also enlarged its authority over electricity pricing
and policies..92 Another example, this one from the resource extraction side,
is the regulation of hydraulic fracturing. The current legal structure puts
states in charge of regulating the practice.,93 The Safe Drinking Water Act,
29
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2011 BYU L. REV. 1561.
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RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS: A PLAIN LANGUAGE PRIMER (2008), http://www.opportunitystudies.
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Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 2o FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 115, 142-43 (2009).
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under which the EPA regulates underground injection of fluids, specifically
excludes hydraulic fracturing activities from the definition of underground
injection.94 One way in which federal agencies can amplify their impact on
developing state regulatory regimes, however, is to take advantage of the
federal government's proprietary powers by issuing regulations for hydraulic
fracturing on public lands. The Department of the Interior has done precisely
that, issuing proposed regulations last spring.95 By moving forward with
regulation in areas it controls, the federal government has signaled that it
wants to encourage hydraulic fracturing and eliminate barriers to
development. It has also provided a set of model regulations, lowering the
transaction costs for states that wish to put in place regulations of their own,
all without the necessity of challenging existing statutory jurisdictional
boundaries.
Given the prominence of the statutory lag problem, especially in energy
and environmental law, it is unsurprising that federal agencies are
implementing existing authorizations creatively. This Article has sought to
begin a broader dialogue about one such technique, bypassing federalism, by
naming it and by offering an in-depth case study of FERC's use of the strategy
to promote demand response. Because statutory lags are likely to remain a
feature of modern governance, it is a conversation worth having.
294. Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 1o9th Cong. § 322 (2005) (enacted).
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